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INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in the early 1980s, and continuing for nearly three 
decades, federal circuit courts unanimously found retail store man-
agers exempt from overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
of 1938 (FLSA).1  The overwhelming consensus even within the De-
 
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006).  For circuit court cases denying store managers’ 
overtime claims, see Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 502-03 
(6th Cir. 2007); Jones v. Va. Oil Co., 69 Fed. App’x 633, 639 (4th Cir. 2003); Murray v. 
Stuckey’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 614, 620 (8th Cir. 1991); Donovan v. Burger King Corp. (Burg-
er King II) , 675 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 1982); Donovan v. Burger King Corp. (Burger 
King I) , 672 F.2d 221, 227 (1st Cir. 1982).  In a 1999 report, the U.S. Government Ac-
countability Office identified this same trend toward exemption.  See U.S. GOV’T AC-
COUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-164, FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT:  WHITE-
COLLAR EXEMPTIONS IN THE MODERN WORK PLACE 4 (1999) (“Our review of federal 
case law and [Department of Labor] compliance cases indicated that it is, in fact, diffi-
cult to challenge exempt classifications if employees supervise two or more full-time 
employees and spend some time—even if minimal—on management tasks.”). 
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partment of Labor (DOL) itself—the body responsible for promul-
gating and enforcing the overtime regulations—was that supervisors 
in charge of a free-standing store were highly likely to fall within the 
exempt category of the statute.2  However, in 2008 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit broke the unanimity by upholding a thirty-six million dollar jury 
verdict against Family Dollar for misclassifying its store managers as 
exempt executives.3  While the extent to which the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision will affect retail store managers’ status under the FLSA re-
mains unclear,4 it has undoubtedly resuscitated managers’ hopes 
that they can prevail on overtime claims by providing them with cir-
cuit precedent on which to stand. 
As the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Morgan v. Family Dollar 
Stores, Inc., pointedly illustrates, the financial repercussions for large 
retailers of misclassifying employees can be immense.5  Tens of mil-
lions of dollars hinge on complex judicial determinations of whether 
retail supervisors are exempt executives and therefore not owed over-
time pay.  Getting this determination right has serious implications not 
only for businesses but also for workers who stand to lose substantial 
wages to which they are statutorily entitled. 
To a large extent, the DOL has already performed the interest 
balancing between employers and employees through notice-and-
comment rulemaking,6 with judges determining only the remainder 
 
2 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 30 (noting that one 
DOL attorney “indicated that, although there may be situations in which the exempt 
executive classification of an employee supervising two or more workers could be chal-
lenged, those situations are very limited”).  
3 Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1240, 1258 & n.34 (11th Cir. 
2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009). 
4 The Eleventh Circuit’s Morgan opinion has failed to convince at least the Fourth 
Circuit, which in March 2011 found a Family Dollar store manager exempt as a matter 
of law.  See In re Family Dollar FLSA Litig., 637 F.3d 508, 518 (4th Cir. 2011) (distin-
guishing Morgan on its facts). 
5 Family Dollar is not the only large retailer that has had to dole out millions for 
misclassifying its employees.  In 2009, for example, a jury found that Staples had will-
fully misclassified its assistant managers as exempt executives.  Stillman v. Staples, Inc., 
No. 07-0849, 2009 WL 1437817, at *2 (D.N.J. May 15, 2009).  Staples subsequently 
agreed to settle that claim and other pending overtime suits for up to $42 million.  Set-
tlement Agreement at 3, In re Staples, Inc. Wage & Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., MDL 
No. 2025, No. 08-5746 (D.N.J. Feb. 5, 2010).  Radioshack and Starbucks are two other 
notable retailers that have reached massive overtime settlements within the last decade, 
$29.9 million and $18 million, respectively, with store managers and assistant manag-
ers.  Lisa Girion, Starbucks Settles Suit on Overtime, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2002, at C1; Radi-
oshack to Pay $29.9 Million to Settle Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at C4.   
6 For a selective look at the notice-and-comment process during the DOL’s 2004 
revisions of the white collar exemptions, see Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for 
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through case-by-case applications of the white collar exemptions.  
The regulations that have emerged from the administrative deci-
sionmaking process purportedly strike a compromise between the 
competing interests of employers and employees.7  This Comment 
argues that the current regulations governing the executive exemp-
tion, as well as the circuit case law that has developed around them, 
unduly favor the employer and pose a nearly insurmountable ob-
stacle to overtime claims, at least in the context of low-salaried re-
tail supervisors. 
I will first discuss the current and former executive-exemption 
regulations promulgated by the DOL, as they provide the operating 
framework for analyzing FLSA overtime claims.  Focusing primarily 
on a handful of cases from the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, and 
Eighth Circuits, I will look at how courts administer the executive 
exemption and in particular how they determine whether an em-
ployee’s primary duty is management—typically the dispositive in-
quiry in overtime suits.  Appellate courts have almost universally 
adopted the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the primary duty test 
in Donovan v. Burger King Corp. (Burger King II), which deemed retail 
supervisors exempt executives as a matter of law.8  The only crack in 
this interpretive monolith appeared with the Eleventh Circuit’s Mor-
gan opinion.  Ongoing litigation over whether Dollar General store 
managers should be exempt from overtime pay suggests that this 
crack could be expanding, although a recent Fourth Circuit opinion 
indicates otherwise.  Nonetheless, I will show through a series of di-
vergent summary judgment rulings on the exempt status of Dollar 
General store managers that judicial interpretations of the primary 
duty factors, and not the underlying facts of the cases themselves, are 
driving this split on the district level. 
 
Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 22,122, 22,172 (Apr. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Defining and Delimiting Exemptions]. 
7 The DOL’s decision to include an automatic exemption for “highly compen-
sated” employees in the current regulations exemplifies this interest balancing.  The 
DOL originally proposed exempting employees who earned more than $65,000 a year 
from overtime pay.  Id. at 22,172.  In response, employee groups advocated against a 
“highly compensated” cutoff while employer groups advocated for setting the cutoff 
even lower.  Id. at 22,173.  The National Association of Convenience Stores and the 
National Retail Federation, for example, recommended setting the cutoff at an annual 
salary of $36,000 and $50,000, respectively.  Id. at 22,174.  Considering the views pre-
sented by both employee and employer constituencies, the DOL ultimately set the bar 
at $100,000 per year.  29 C.F.R. § 541.601(a). 
8 See Burger King II, 675 F.2d 516, 521-22 (2d Cir. 1982) (concluding that Burger 
King assistant managers’ primary duties were managerial). 
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The divergent summary judgment rulings demonstrate that low-
salaried retail supervisors, like Dollar General store managers, strad-
dle the fence between being exempt from and being entitled to 
overtime pay.  Not surprisingly, because of the decades of circuit 
precedent weighing against store managers’ overtime claims, more 
district courts have exempted these managers from overtime pay 
than have not.  These results, I will argue, would likely be different if 
(1) the DOL or the courts reconfigured the primary-duty analysis to 
level the playing field between employers and employees and (2) the 
executive exemption contained a more vigorous salary-level re-
quirement.  Unless the DOL reconsiders the current executive ex-
emption or courts modify their approach to the primary-duty test, 
employees whom the FLSA was originally intended to cover will be 
denied earnings that they rightfully deserve. 
I.  THE GOVERNING FRAMEWORK:  THE CURRENT AND FORMER 
EXECUTIVE EXEMPTION REGULATIONS 
Under federal law, overtime claims are governed by the FLSA, 
which entitles employees who work over forty hours in a work week 
to receive wages at one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay for 
any overtime.9  The Act, though, contains certain white collar ex-
emptions—executive, administrative, and professional—that restrict 
the categories of employees to whom employers must pay overtime.10  
The statute grants the Secretary of Labor “broad authority to ‘define 
and delimit’ the scope” of the exemption.11  In 1938, the year of the 
FLSA’s enactment, the DOL issued its first set of regulations and re-
vised them on multiple occasions throughout the 1940s.12  Substan-
tial revisions to the exemptions were not made again until 2004.13 
While some minor changes were made to the executive-
exemption regulations in 2004, they have largely remained intact 
and unaltered.  Unless explicitly noted otherwise, this Comment re-
fers to the pre-2004 regulations for several reasons:  (1) the federal 
 
9 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (2006). 
10 Id. § 213(a). 
11 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 456 (1997) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) 
(1994)); see also Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 613 n.6 (1944) 
(noting the Secretary of Labor’s authority to “define and delimit” the “terms” used in 
the white collar exemptions). 
12 Defining and Delimiting Exemptions, supra note 6, at 22,124.   
13 See id. (“The major substantive provisions of the Part 541 regulations have re-
mained virtually unchanged for 50 years.”). 
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circuit case law operates under the old regulations; (2) the Dollar 
General cases, for the most part, deal with claims that arose prior to 
2004; and (3) courts have noted that their analyses would yield the 
same result regardless of whether the pre-2004 or current regula-
tions were applied.14  I discuss any changes in the regulations that 
could potentially impact ongoing and future litigation in Section IV.A. 
To qualify as exempt under the white collar regulations, em-
ployees must satisfy three criteria:  (1) be paid on a salary basis (sala-
ry-basis test); (2) earn above a certain minimum salary level per week 
(salary-level test); and (3) perform certain duties (duties test).15  The 
current regulations require that employees earn a minimum of $455 
per week to qualify for the exemption, whereas the former regula-
tions set the minimum at $155.16  Under the former regulations, 
courts applied two separate duties tests—a “short-duties” test and a 
“long-duties” test—based upon the employee’s weekly salary level.17  
If the employee earned less than $250 per week, the long test was 
applied and, if the employee earned $250 or more, the short test was 
used.18  All cases referenced in this Comment apply the short-duties 
test,19 which exempts from overtime pay only those employees who 
(1) have management as their primary duty and (2) regularly direct 
two or more employees.20 
By and large, the exempt status of retail store managers has 
turned on the question of whether they have management as their 
 
14 See, e.g., Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 504 n.5 (6th Cir. 
2007) (“Because the current and former regulations are so similar, our resolution of this 
case under the former regulations provides guidance to courts performing the ‘primary 
duty’ analysis under the current regulations.” (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.700 (2007))).  
15 29 C.F.R. § 541.100 (2010). 
16 Compare id. § 541.100(a)(1) (setting the minimum weekly salary level at $455), 
with 29 C.F.R. § 541.117(a) (2003) (amended 2004) (setting the minimum weekly sala-
ry level at $155). 
17 Compare 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(a)–(e) (2003) (amended 2004) (laying out the long-
duties test), with id. § 541.1(f) (laying out the short-duties test). 
18 Id. § 541.1(f). 
19 Before the 2004 revisions, courts rarely applied the long-duties test because of 
the outdated salary levels, which even low-salaried retail supervisors generally satisfied.  
For a list of the factors considered in this test, see id. § 541.1. 
20 Id. § 541.1(f).  The current regulations have done away with the two-tiered 
short-duties and long-duties test and instead adopt a single standard-duties test for all 
employees.  The duties an employee must meet to qualify for executive exemption in-
clude:  (1) having management as her primary duty; (2) regularly directing two or 
more employees; and (3) wielding the authority to hire or fire other employees or to 
recommend changes to their status which are given “particular weight.”  29 C.F.R. 
§ 541.100(a) (2010).  
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“primary duty.”  The current regulations define “primary duty” as 
the “principal, main, major or most important duty that the em-
ployee performs.”21  The initial factor usually considered under the 
primary-duty analysis is the amount of time the employee spends on 
managerial (exempt) versus nonmanagerial (nonexempt) duties, or 
the “time-allocation prong” of the primary-duty test.22  The updated 
and former regulations provide an illustrative list of managerial du-
ties, which can be divided into two representative categories:   
(1) personnel management and (2) business operations.  Personnel 
management constitutes the bulk of the managerial duties listed and 
includes tasks like interviewing and training employees, setting their 
pay rates and work hours, and generally supervising their work.23  
Meanwhile, on the business operations side, managerial responsibili-
ties consist of procuring necessary supplies and materials, regulating 
merchandise flow, and ensuring the safety of employees and clients.24 
If an employee spends more than fifty percent of her time on 
managerial duties, that employee, barring exceptional circums-
tances, has management as her primary duty.25  If the employee 
spends the majority of her time on nonmanagerial duties, then 
courts should consider “other pertinent factors.”26  These nonexclu-
 
21 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a). 
22 See, e.g., In re Family Dollar FLSA Litig., 637 F.3d 508, 514-15 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(discussing the time-allocation prong first among the primary-duty factors); Burger King 
II, 675 F.2d 516, 520-21 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing whether Burger King assistant man-
agers spent the majority of their time on managerial duties before examining the other 
factors of the primary-duty test).   
23 The regulations include the following comprehensive list of personnel man-
agement duties:  
Interviewing, selecting, and training of employees; setting and adjusting their 
rates of pay and hours of work; directing their work; maintaining their pro-
duction or sales records for use in supervision or control; appraising their 
productivity and efficiency for the purpose of recommending promotions or 
other changes in their status; handling their complaints and grievances and 
disciplining them when necessary; planning the work; determining the tech-
niques to be used; apportioning the work among the workers . . . .  
29 C.F.R. § 541.102 (2003) (amended 2004).   
24 Id.  The updated regulations add two managerial business operations duties to 
the list:  (1) “planning and controlling the budget” and (2) “monitoring or imple-
menting legal compliance measures.”  29 C.F.R. § 541.102 (2010).  
25 I have been unable to find a case in which a retail store manager has argued that she 
is not an exempt executive even though she spent over fifty percent of her time on mana-
gerial duties, let alone a case that has held for an employee in such a circumstance.  
26 29 C.F.R. § 541.103 (2003) (amended 2004). 
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sive factors27 include:  (1) the relative importance of an employee’s 
managerial responsibilities as compared to her nonmanagerial du-
ties (relative-importance prong); (2) the regularity with which an 
employee exercises discretion in her work (discretionary-powers 
prong); (3) the degree of freedom an employee has from supervi-
sion (freedom-from-supervision prong); and (4) the relationship be-
tween an employee’s salary and the wages paid to other workers 
(wage-comparison prong). 
II.  ONE CIRCUIT VERSUS MANY:  NOT ALL RETAIL STORE MANAGERS 
 HAVE MANAGEMENT AS THEIR PRIMARY DUTY 
A.  The Legacy of Burger King:  Retail Store Managers 
Exempt as a Matter of Law? 
Circuit and district courts have overwhelmingly upheld retail 
employers’ exempt classifications of frontline supervisors.28  The 
prevailing appellate precedent dates from the early 1980s when the 
First and Second Circuits rejected the Secretary of Labor’s argu-
ments that Burger King misclassified its assistant managers as ex-
empt, owed them overtime pay, and should have been enjoined 
from designating them as exempt in the future.29  The dispute—as in 
 
27 While the regulations permit the consideration of other factors, see 29 C.F.R. 
§ 541.700(a) (2010) (“Factors to consider when determining the primary duty of an 
employee include, but are not limited to . . . .” (emphasis added)), courts have limited 
their analysis to those factors explicitly outlined by the DOL.  
28 Of course, retail store managers are always entitled to challenge these classifica-
tions since FLSA exemptions are determined on a case-by-case—factual circumstance 
to factual circumstance—basis.  See, e.g., Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 
F.3d 496, 503 n.4 (6th Cir. 2007) (“We do not adopt a rule that any employee who is in 
charge of a store has management as her primary duty . . . . [T]he proper analytical 
approach is to scrutinize the factors in the Secretary’s regulations, not simply to de-
termine whether the employee was ‘in charge.’”).  However, lower-level supervisors are 
generally unlikely to succeed on such claims.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
supra note 1, at 29-30 (finding that among executive-exemption cases by “lower-
income supervisor[s]” from 1994 to 1998 only one out of twelve supervisors making 
$500 or less per week obtained a “favorable ruling”); Peter D. DeChiara, Rethinking the 
Managerial-Professional Exemption of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 139, 
150 & n.66 (1993) (collecting cases and concluding that “court decisions have made it 
clear that frontline supervisors do not enjoy FLSA coverage”).   
29 See Burger King II, 675 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 1982); Burger King I, 672 F.2d 221, 
226-28 (1st Cir. 1982).  A critical fact about the Burger King assistant managers is that 
each of them was generally the most senior employee at their restaurants when on du-
ty.  While two assistant managers and a store manager worked at the same location, 
their schedules rarely overlapped and so each essentially functioned like an indepen-
dent store operator.  Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 517; Burger King I, 672 F.2d at 223. 
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nearly all executive-exemption cases—centered on whether the as-
sistant managers earning $250 or more had management as their 
primary duty.30  Secretary Shaun Donovan contended that manage-
ment was not the workers’ primary duty because (1) they spent over 
fifty percent of their time on nonmanagerial tasks, and (2) Burger 
King’s corporate strictures excessively constrained their ability to ex-
ercise meaningful managerial discretion.31 
Prior to the Burger King rulings, the DOL had rigidly applied the 
time-allocation prong of the executive-exemption regulations and 
treated it as fairly determinative of an employee’s exempt status.32  If 
an employee spent over fifty percent of her time on nonmanagerial 
tasks—such as sweeping the floor and flipping burgers—the DOL 
was likely to consider the employee nonexempt and thus eligible for 
overtime pay.  On the other hand, if a worker dedicated over fifty 
percent of her time to managerial duties—such as training, direct-
ing, and scheduling employees—that individual would have been ip-
so facto deemed an exempt executive.33 
The Second Circuit, however, disagreed with the Secretary’s 
heavy reliance on the time provision and minimized the provision’s 
role in the primary-duty analysis.  The court directed the Secretary to 
subsequent language in the regulations regarding an employee’s 
primary duties:  “‘[T]ime alone . . . is not the sole test,’ and . . . an 
employee” who spends over fifty percent of her time on nonmana-
gerial duties “may ‘nevertheless have management as his primary du-
 
30 Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 520-21; Burger King I, 672 F.2d at 225.  In the Burger 
King cases, there were two sets of assistant managers—those who earned less than $250 
per week and those who earned $250 or more.  Applying the long-duties test to those 
who earned less than $250 per week, the circuits determined that such managers were 
not exempt as a matter of law and were accordingly owed overtime pay because they 
had spent forty percent of their time on nonmanagerial duties.  Burger King II, 675 F.2d 
at 519-20; Burger King I, 672 F.2d at 222-28.  Those assistant managers who earned at 
least $250 per week had their status under FLSA governed by the short-duties test.  
Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 518; Burger King I, 672 F.2d at 225.  As such, the assistant 
managers could have been exempted from overtime pay if they had “management” as 
their primary duty and regularly supervised the work of two or more employees.  29 
C.F.R. § 541.1(f) (2003) (amended 2004). 
31 Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 521-22. 
32 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 30 (explaining that the 
DOL revised its policy manual after the Burger King decisions to “require that investiga-
tors consider percentage limitations as only one factor when assessing the employee’s 
primary duty”).  
33 See 29 C.F.R. § 541.103 (“[I]t may be taken as a good rule of thumb that 
primary duty means the major part, or over 50 percent, of the employee’s time.”).  
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ty if the other pertinent factors support such a conclusion.’”34  In 
other words, the percentage allocation of a supervisor’s time be-
tween managerial and nonmanagerial duties offers a “rule of thumb” 
or “useful guide” for determining an employee’s primary duty, but 
the test is in no way dispositive.35  The Second Circuit made abundant-
ly clear that the time allocation between managerial and nonmana-
gerial duties constitutes the first—not sole—hurdle an employee must 
overcome in order to prevail on the primary-duty question.36 
In minimizing the time element, the Second Circuit thrust the 
“other relevant factors”—relative importance of duties, exercise of 
discretion, freedom from supervision, and wage comparisons—to 
the forefront of the primary-duty analysis.37  The issue of whether 
Burger King assistant managers exercised discretion when perform-
ing their managerial duties occupied a disproportionate amount of 
the court’s attention.38  On the wage-comparison prong, the court 
summarily concluded that the assistant managers earned “substan-
tially higher wages” than their coworkers without offering an analyti-
cal framework for future cases.39  The Second Circuit’s observations 
about the relative-importance and freedom-from-supervision factors 
were more insightful. 
In comparing the relative importance of the assistant manag-
ers’ exempt and nonexempt duties, the Second Circuit reached the 
conclusion that their managerial duties represented their “princip-
 
34 Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 521 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 154.103 (1981) 
(amended 2004)).   
35 Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.103).  
36 The case law abounds with scenarios where a retail store manager post–Burger 
King has spent an overwhelming percentage of her time on nonmanagerial duties, yet 
has been deemed exempt.  For examples, see infra note 87.  
37 See Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 521 (concluding that “[t]he other ‘pertinent fac-
tors’ . . . support [Burger King’s] position” (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.103 (1981))).  The 
First Circuit’s Burger King I opinion does not offer the analytical framework for the 
primary-duty analysis that the Second Circuit’s does, which is why most cases cite to the 
Second, rather than the First, Circuit’s opinion.     
38 Notably, the current regulations have abandoned this prong of the primary-duty 
analysis.  See 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a) (2010).  For a discussion of the impact this altera-
tion could have on retail supervisors’ efforts to claim overtime pay, see infra text ac-
companying note 176.   
39 Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 522.  The Burger King cases are not exceptional in how 
they handle the wage-comparison prong of the primary-duty analysis.  In fact, courts tend 
to treat this factor as an afterthought and give it little, if any, weight when deciding cases.  
For more detailed discussion of the wage-comparison prong, see infra subsection IV.C.3.   
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al responsibilities.”40  The court defined “principal responsibilities” 
as those duties “most important or critical to the success of the res-
taurant.”41  As evidence that the managerial duties were more im-
portant, the court identified the following:  (1) the assistant man-
agers’ own testimony; (2) the fact that managerial duties were 
more vital to the restaurant’s success; and (3) the managers’ ability 
to perform exempt and nonexempt work concurrently.42  Indeed, 
the Second Circuit turned the plaintiffs’ own testimony against 
them.  The managers during the bench trial below had admitted 
that they considered their managerial responsibilities more impor-
tant than their nonmanagerial duties.43 
Second, and arguably most critical, the court tied the relative-
importance inquiry to the store’s business success.  In other words, 
the proper inquiry asks:  are the managerial or nonmanagerial du-
ties more critical to the economic viability of the Burger King restau-
rants?  The Second Circuit found that managerial duties were more 
important:  “[I]t is clear that the restaurants could not operate suc-
cessfully unless the managerial functions of Assistant Managers, such 
as determining amounts of food to be prepared, running cash 
checks, scheduling employees, keeping track of inventory, and as-
signing employees to particular jobs, were performed.”44  Under this 
“success” framework, the answer that managerial duties are more 
important seems rather predetermined.  As subsequent cases reveal, 
that is largely true. 
 
40 Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 521.  While this Comment devotes substantial space to 
the Second Circuit’s treatment of the relative-importance prong, the court itself spent 
three sentences on the issue.   
41 Id. (emphasis added). 
42 Id. 
43 Courts since the Burger King cases have often cited deposition testimony by retail 
supervisors as support for finding that managerial duties were more important than 
nonmanagerial ones.  See, e.g., Aschenbrenner v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-0153, 2011 
WL 2200630, at *14 (D. Neb. June 3, 2011) (“Most important, [the store manager’s] 
own testimony supports the conclusion that her managerial duties represented the 
most important part of her job.”); In re Dollar Gen. Stores FLSA Litig., 766 F. Supp. 2d 
631, 641 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (“Most significantly, the store managers’ own testimony de-
monstrates that their managerial tasks constituted the most important part of their 
jobs.”); Roberts v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0005, 2010 WL 4806792, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. 
Nov. 18, 2010) (pointing to deposition testimony in which the plaintiff described her-
self as the store’s “leader” and the person “in charge”); Mayne-Harrison v. Dolgencorp, 
Inc., No. 09-0042, 2010 WL 3717604, at *21 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 17, 2010) (noting that 
the plaintiff testified that she was “‘the one in charge’ at the store” and “that she never 
stopped managing her store even when performing nonmanagerial tasks”).   
44 Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 521.   
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To further deemphasize the importance one might attribute to 
the significant amounts of time Burger King assistant managers 
spent on menial labor, the Second Circuit—in a move subsequently 
emulated by many courts45 and now codified in the DOL regula-
tions46—ruled that managerial and nonmanagerial duties could be 
performed concurrently.47  While the Second Circuit did not ex-
pound upon its reasoning, one can infer that it did not see the ma-
nagerial and nonmanagerial duties as entirely separable.  The First 
Circuit, taking a similar stance in Burger King I, explained that “an 
employee can manage while performing other work, and that this 
other work does not negate the conclusion that his primary duty 
is management.”48  If taken seriously, the Burger King cases stand 
for the proposition that managerial duties will almost inevitably, 
by their very nature, be more important than nonmanagerial re-
sponsibilities. 
On the discretionary-powers prong, the Second Circuit refuted 
the Secretary’s contention that Burger King’s corporate policies un-
duly circumscribed the assistant managers’ ability to exercise judg-
ment when managing their stores.49  The court provided numerous 
illustrations of how, even within the constraints imposed by upper 
management, the managers exercised discretion, including the 
scheduling and directing of employees and the handling of “cash or 
inventory irregularities.”50  In explication of its reasoning, the court 
offered the following: 
We fully recognize that the economic genius of the Burger King enter-
prise lies in providing uniform products and service economically in 
many different locations and that adherence by Assistant Managers to a 
remarkably detailed routine is critical to commercial success.  The ex-
ercise of discretion, however, even where circumscribed by prior in-
 
45 See infra subsection IV.C.2. 
46 See 29 C.F.R. § 541.106 (2010) (mandating that “[c]oncurent performance of ex-
empt and nonexempt work does not disqualify an employee from the executive exemp-
tion if the requirements of § 541.100 are otherwise met”).  For further discussion of the 
regulatory definition of concurrent duties, see infra text accompanying notes 174-75.   
47 The Second Circuit reasoned, “[T]he fact that much of the oversight of the op-
eration can be carried out simultaneously with the performance of non-exempt work” 
supported the conclusion that “the principal or most important work of these em-
ployees is managerial.”  Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 521.  
48 Burger King I, 672 F.2d 221, 226 (1st Cir. 1982). 
49 Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 521-22. 
50 Id. at 521.  Other examples of areas where the managers exercised discretion 
included ordering supplies, dealing with the public, and ensuring that employees were 
performing their jobs.  Id. 
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struction, is as critical to that success as adherence to “the book.”  
Burger King, of course, seeks to limit likely mistakes in judgment by is-
suing detailed guidelines, but judgments must still be made.  In the 
competitive, low margin circumstances of this business, the wrong 
number of employees, too many or too few supplies on hand, delays in 
service, the preparation of food which must be thrown away, or an un-
derdirected or undersupervised work force all can make the difference 
between commercial success and failure.
51
 
Thus, as interpreted by the First and Second Circuits, the regulations 
do not demand that exempt retail supervisors have the ability to ex-
ercise unfettered discretion.  In fact, executing company-wide oper-
ating procedures suffices.52  
Alongside its staple analyses of the relative-importance and dis-
cretionary-powers prongs, the Second Circuit has heavily influenced 
subsequent interpretations of the freedom-from-supervision factor.  
The court found that the Burger King assistant managers satisfied 
this condition because they were “in charge” of their restaurants and 
were the “‘boss’ in title and fact.”53  The assistant managers called the 
shots while on duty, and although the managers could reach out to 
the lead manager by phone, the Second Circuit did not consider 
that sufficient supervision to find in their favor.54  While not stating 
so explicitly, the court seemed to interpret the freedom-from-
supervision prong as requiring some type of sustained direct over-
sight.  In other words, unless someone physically oversees and di-
 
51 Id. at 521-22.  The First Circuit reached the same conclusion and found the as-
sistant managers exempt despite Burger King’s “well-defined policies” and the fact that 
“tasks [were] spelled out in great detail.”  Burger King I, 672 F.2d at 226.      
52 When reformulating the executive-exemption test, the DOL initially proposed 
that an employer’s “well-defined operating policies or procedures should not by itself 
defeat an employee’s exempt status.”  Defining and Delimiting Exemptions, supra note 
6, at 22,185.  The Burger King line of cases certainly influenced this proposed regula-
tion, as it incorporated language from the First Circuit’s opinion.  See Burger King I, 672 
F.2d at 226 (“The fact that Burger King has well-defined policies, and that tasks are 
spelled out in great detail, is insufficient to negate th[e] conclusion” that the assistant 
managers had management as their primary duty. (emphasis added)).  Perplexingly, 
the DOL abandoned the proposed rule change because “it seem[ed] relevant only to 
the administrative exemption.”  Defining and Delimiting Exemptions, supra note 6, at 
22,185.  While courts have never treated the issue of corporate policies as dispositive of 
an employee’s primary duty, it is a factor they consider, particularly under the discre-
tionary-powers prong, and the proposed rule could have potentially influenced the 
role such policies played in the analysis.  Attributing the rule’s abandonment to “rele-
vancy” seems strange and unsatisfying.   
53 Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 522; see also Burger King I, 672 F.2d at 227 (“[T]he per-
son ‘in charge’ of a store has management as his primary duty . . . .”). 
54 Burger King II, 675 F.2d at 522. 
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rects an employee’s work on a regular basis, that employee will be 
considered free from supervision.  Such an interpretation, of 
course, makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for managers 
responsible for the day-to-day operations of free-standing stores to 
prevail on this prong.  In the end, the Second Circuit found that all 
four factors weighed in favor of exempting the managers from 
overtime pay.55 
B.  In the Wake of Burger King:  Circuits Solidify 
the Exempt Status of Retail Store Managers 
A little less than a decade after the Burger King cases, the Eighth 
Circuit, in Murray v. Stuckey’s, Inc., followed the First and Second 
Circuits’ lead by finding that Stuckey’s stores—stores that combined 
gasoline stations, convenience markets, and restaurants—properly 
classified their managers as exempt executives.56  The influence of 
the Burger King cases on the Eighth Circuit’s legal reasoning is evi-
dent.  Even though the store managers claimed to have spent sixty-
five to ninety percent of their time on manual tasks—like pumping 
gas, stocking shelves, and waiting on customers—the court largely 
ignored this purported imbalance between managerial57 and non-
managerial duties.58  Instead, it focused on the other relevant factors, 
namely whether the store managers exhibited sufficient discretion in 
their managerial roles and operated free from supervision.59 
Referencing the Burger King cases, the Eighth Circuit decided 
that “the manager of a local store in a modern multi-store organiza-
tion has management as his or her primary duty even though the 
discretion usually associated with management may be limited by the 
 
55 Id. at 522. The Second Circuit rejected the Secretary’s contention that the court 
should defer to his interpretation of the regulations and find that the Burger King as-
sistant managers were not exempt executives.  Id.  The court explained, “If the Secre-
tary believes that the underlying legislation was intended to cover employees such as 
Burger King’s Assistant Managers, or that employees doing identical work for an em-
ployer should have identical legal status so far as overtime is concerned, he should re-
consider the regulations as issued.”  Id.   
56 939 F.2d 614, 620-21 (8th Cir. 1991). 
57 The managerial duties of the store managers highlighted by the court included 
hiring and firing workers, “training and supervising store employees, ordering mer-
chandise, handling customer complaints, and safe-guarding cash receipts.”  Id. at 618. 
58 See id. (“The district court’s finding that the managers spent 65-90 percent of their 
time on non-managerial duties . . . is not a controlling factor under the regulations.”).  
59 Id. at 619.  The Eighth Circuit, somewhat puzzlingly, failed even to mention the 
relative-importance or wage-comparison prongs of the primary-duty analysis.   
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company’s desire for standardization and uniformity.”60  While ad-
mitting that the managers’ “discretion was circumscribed,” the court 
held that they were the “on-site employees ultimately responsible for 
the stores’ operations” and therefore exempt.61  The Eighth Circuit 
further found that, despite the store managers’ being “actively su-
pervised” by a regional manager,62 they operated sufficiently free 
from supervision to merit their exemption from overtime pay.63 
Some fifteen years later, leaning heavily on the Burger King and 
Murray opinions, the Sixth Circuit in Thomas v. Speedway SuperAme-
rica, LLC, reached a similar conclusion, finding the manager of a 
gas station and convenience store exempt as a matter of law.64  The 
store manager allocated approximately sixty percent of her time to 
nonmanagerial tasks—stocking merchandise, sweeping floors, op-
erating the register, etc.—and dedicated the remainder of her 
time to managerial duties, such as interviewing and hiring em-
ployees and setting weekly work schedules.65  The court, though, 
found that the other relevant primary-duty factors overwhelmingly 
favored Speedway.66 
Borrowing the analytical framework from Burger King II, the 
Sixth Circuit assessed the relative importance of managerial and 
nonmanagerial duties by looking at which was more critical to the 
success of the business and concluded that managerial duties were 
more important.67  In an oft-quoted passage, the Sixth Circuit elabo-
rated on its reasoning: 
If Thomas failed to perform her nonmanagerial duties, her Speedway 
station would still function, albeit much less effectively. . . . If, however, 
 
60 Id.  When undertaking the primary-duty analysis, courts frequently cite this 
“modern multi-store organization” language.  See, e.g., Thomas v. Speedway SuperAme-
rica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 507 (6th Cir. 2007); Jones v. Va. Oil Co., 69 Fed. App’x 633, 
638 (4th Cir. 2003). 
61 Murray, 939 F.2d at 620. 
62 Id. at 619.  Active supervision in Murray meant that regional managers visited 
the store “from time to time” and communicated by phone with the store managers on 
a weekly basis.  Id.  
63 Id.  The Eighth Circuit at one point confusingly asserted that, under the DOL 
regulations, employers were entitled to have at least one exempt employee at retail 
stores like Stuckey’s.  See id. at 618 (“The employer is . . . entitled under the FLSA and 
the regulations to have one designated exempt executive at this type of facility.”).  Nei-
ther the former nor the current regulations support such a conclusion. 
64 Speedway, 506 F.3d at 509. 
65 Id. at 499, 507. 
66 Id. at 509.  
67 Id. at 505-06. 
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Thomas failed to perform her managerial duties, her Speedway station 
would not function at all because no one else would perform these es-
sential tasks.  Surely, a gas station cannot operate if it has not hired any 
employees, has not scheduled any employees to work, or has not 




Following in the footsteps of the Burger King and Murray courts, 
the Speedway court also determined that the store managers could 
exercise discretion even if corporate dictates considerably circum-
scribed the ambit of their decisionmaking.69  Speedway had deli-
neated “detailed company policies and standardized operating pro-
cedures,” which the plaintiff was supposed to follow in fulfilling her 
managerial duties.70  The Sixth Circuit nonetheless noted that the 
plaintiff had discretion in a number of areas, including evaluating 
employees’ performance, deciding what inventory to order during 
high-demand periods, and resolving employee complaints.71  The 
court concluded that “[w]hile her discretion was by no means unfet-
tered and abounding, she exercised discretion over important ma-
nagerial functions on a sufficiently frequent basis to support a find-
ing that management was her primary duty.”72 
Once again combining the Burger King II and Murray analyses, 
the Sixth Circuit restricted the supervision inquiry to “direct over-
the-shoulder oversight on a day-to-day basis.”73  Although the dis-
trict manager monitored the plaintiff’s job performance,74 the 
court did not consider this monitoring extensive enough to push 
the freedom-from-supervision prong in her favor.75  In the end, the 
Speedway court found all other relevant primary-duty factors for the 
employer and summarily rejected the plaintiff’s overtime claim.76 
 
68 Id. at 505.  For examples of decisions that mimic the Sixth Circuit’s language, 
see infra note 161 and accompanying text.   
69 Speedway, 506 F.3d at 507-08. 
70 Id. at 499. 
71 Id. at 507. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 508. 
74 The district manager’s monitoring included site visits once or twice a week and 
regular communication over the phone and via email.  Id. at 507.  
75 See id. at 508 (“[D]espite [the district manager’s] involvement and monitoring 
. . . , Thomas operated free from direct over-the-shoulder oversight on a day-to-day ba-
sis, and we conclude that this relative freedom from supervision was sufficient enough 
to support a finding that her primary duty was management.”). 
76 See id. at 509 (“Speedway . . . has established that each of the four factors sup-
ports its position and, in general, has produced abundant evidence indicating that 
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C.  Charting a New Course:  The Landmark 
Family Dollar Class Action 
Despite the seemingly insurmountable circuit and district court 
precedent awaiting store managers seeking to challenge their classifi-
cations as exempt executives, Family Dollar store managers accom-
plished the unthinkable in 2006 and prevailed on their overtime 
claims, securing a jury verdict in excess of $35.5 million, which the 
Eleventh Circuit subsequently upheld.77  Predictably, Family Dollar 
evoked the Burger King line of cases in arguing that its store managers 
were exempt executives as a matter of law.78  Family Dollar asserted 
that because its managers were “in charge” of the store, like the man-
agers in Burger King I and II, Murray, and Speedway, a court could reach 
no conclusion other than exemption.79  The Eleventh Circuit’s re-
sponse was twofold:  (1) the executive-exemption test is highly fact in-
tensive and so it would be improper to limit the analysis to a single 
consideration, and (2) the Family Dollar set of facts was “materially 
dissimilar” to that in the cited cases.80  In distinguishing the common 
facts of the Burger King line of cases, the Eleventh Circuit highlighted 
the convergence of three principal differences:  (1) the high percen-
tage of nonexempt work Family Dollar store managers performed; (2) 
the “severe degree of restriction” corporate policy imposed on man-
ager discretion; and (3) the over-the-shoulder supervision district 
managers exercised.81 
What is most striking about the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is its 
tone, which contrasts sharply with that in Burger King II and its proge-
ny.  When reading the opinion, one is tempted to think that if the 
court in Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., had heard the arguments 
of Secretary Donovan, the Burger King cases might well have been de-
 
Thomas’s primary duty was management.”).  On the wage-comparison prong, the 
court found that the plaintiff earned a salary that was thirty percent greater than those 
of the employees under her supervision and concluded that was a “significant 
amount.”  Id. at 509.  For further discussion of this prong, see infra subsection IV.C.3.    
77 Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1240, 1285 (11th Cir. 
2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009). 
78 See id. at 1271 (“Family Dollar cites several cases concluding that managers of a 
free-standing store or restaurant were exempt as a matter of law.”).  In fact, the Ele-
venth Circuit devoted an entire subsection to distinguishing Morgan’s facts from those 
of Burger King I and II, Murray, and Speedway.  Id. at 1271-73.    
79 See id. 1271-72 (“Family Dollar insists its store managers were ‘in charge’ of the 
store, and therefore, exempt as a matter of law.”). 
80 Id. at 1272-73. 
81 Id. at 1272. 
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cided differently.  Although the court attempts to distance its opinion 
from those of the other circuits, it clearly makes normative judgments 
that conflict with, or at the very least are in tension with, those made 
in Burger King I and II, Murray, and Speedway.  For instance, the Morgan 
court viewed the effects of corporate policy on the primary-duty analy-
sis differently than its sister circuits and placed much greater emphasis 
on the time-allocation prong.82 
Notably, the Morgan court was reviewing a denial of a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law.83  In other words, so long as “reasonable 
and fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment might 
reach different conclusions based on the evidence presented,” then 
the jury verdict against Family Dollar would be upheld.84  Given the 
standard of review, the Eighth Circuit did not necessarily have to 
agree that the jury reached the “right” conclusion, only that there was 
sufficient evidence to support whatever outcome it had reached.  The 
court’s rhetoric, however, powerfully conveyed its belief that the lower 
court correctly resolved the issue and thus that the Family Dollar store 
managers were not properly classified as exempt.85  Essentially, the 
court said that had it been the jury, it likely would have reached the 
same result, and that the case wouldn’t have been close.  
The importance to the Morgan court’s analysis of the fact that 
Family Dollar store managers spent eighty to ninety percent of their 
time on manual tasks86 cannot be overstated.  Not only had its sister 
circuits implicitly rendered the time element irrelevant in their pri-
mary-duty analyses, so too had scores of district courts.87  While this 
 
82 See infra text accompanying notes 86-88. 
83 551 F.3d at 1247 n.8. 
84 Id. at 1248 n.8 (quoting Millennium Partners, L.P. v. Colmar Storage, LLC, 494 
F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (11th Cir. 2007)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a) (setting forth the 
standard for judgment as a matter of law). 
85 Perhaps most revealing were the descriptive words that the court used to de-
scribe the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict.  For example, the 
court characterized the evidence showing that Family Dollar store managers dedicated 
upwards of eighty to ninety percent of their time to nonmanagerial tasks as “over-
whelming.”  Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1269.  Similarly, the court characterized the evidence 
relating to the other relevant factors as “substantial” and thus “support[ive of] the 
jury’s verdict” that management was not the managers’ primary duty.  Id. at 1270.  Last-
ly, the evidence that the managers’ nonmanagerial functions were more important 
than their managerial ones and that they could not operate free from supervision was 
“ample,” according to the court.  Id. 
86 These nonmanagerial duties included “stocking shelves, running the cash regis-
ters, unloading trucks, and cleaning the parking lots, floors, and bathrooms.”  Id. at 1269. 
87 In a 2006 opinion, the Southern District of Florida compiled a number of cases 
in which retail store managers were found exempt despite spending disproportionate 
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essential fact was by no means a lynchpin of the Morgan court’s analy-
sis, it did imbue the court’s assessment of the other relevant factors.  
Rather than simply turn to these factors and evaluate them in isola-
tion, as Burger King and its progeny had done, the Eleventh Circuit 
took a more holistic, totality-of-the-circumstances approach.88 
For example, under the relative-importance prong, the court 
highlighted Family Dollar’s “business model,” observing that the per-
formance of a “large amount of manual labor” by store managers was 
“a key” to the company’s economic success.89  As the court’s analysis 
typifies, the fact that Family Dollar store managers spent upwards of 
ninety percent of their time on nonmanagerial tasks had significance 
beyond just the time-allocation prong of the primary-duty test.  In par-
ticular, it affected the court’s determination of whether Family Dollar 
valued store managers’ performance of managerial or nonmanagerial 
duties more.90  How store managers allotted time among their various 
duties may not matter in isolation, but when considered in conjunc-
tion with the other primary-duty factors, it certainly could. 
A second critical distinction the Morgan court made was that the 
Family Dollar store managers could not simultaneously perform their 
managerial and nonmanagerial duties.91  Given that no overlap could 
occur between these two sets of duties, the eighty to ninety percent of 
managers’ time spent on manual labor consisted solely of nonexempt 
work.92  The court based its conclusion on evidence that for store man-
agers “[t]he amount of manual labor overwhelmed their capacity to 
perform managerial duties concurrently during store hours.”93  As an 
 
amounts of time completing nonmanagerial tasks.  See Posely v. Eckerd Corp., 433 F. 
Supp. 2d 1287, 1302-03 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (“[T]he case law is replete with decisions hold-
ing managers of retail establishments to be exempt, notwithstanding the fact that they 
spent the majority of their time performing non-exempt tasks . . . .”); see also Jackson v. 
Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1334 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (agreeing with the 
employer that assistant managers were exempt despite spending ninety percent of their 
time on manual work); Moore v. Tractor Supply Co., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1273, 1279 
(S.D. Fla. 2004) (finding a store manager exempt who spent ninety-five percent of his 
time on nonmanagerial tasks), aff’d per curiam, 140 Fed. App’x 168 (11th Cir. 2005).  
88 See Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1273 (“[O]ur affirmance of the jury’s verdict . . . is based 
on a fact-intensive application of the factors espoused in the regulations, and not on a 
categorical approach of whether a particular employee is ‘in charge.’”). 
89 Id. at 1270.  
90 See id. (“[A]mple evidence supported a finding that the non-managerial tasks 
not only consumed 90% of a store manager’s time but were of equal or greater impor-
tance to a store’s functioning and success.”). 
91 Id. at 1272-73. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 1272. 
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example, the court explained, “A store manager unloading a truck and 
stocking the storeroom was not concurrently supervising the cashier out 
front.”94 
While grounded in the factual record, the inference drawn by the 
Eleventh Circuit is starkly at odds with that of Burger King and its ilk in 
which the courts more or less assumed that managerial and nonma-
nagerial duties can be performed simultaneously.  For instance, the 
First Circuit in Burger King I reasoned that “an employee can manage 
while performing other work, and that this other work does not ne-
gate the conclusion that his primary duty is management.”95  The 
problem with the First Circuit’s approach in practice is how courts are 
to separate managerial from nonmanagerial duties.  If the Morgan 
court had fully embraced the concept of concurrent duties, it might 
have found the Family Dollar store managers exempt.  But even if 
the outcome remained the same, it nonetheless would have made 
for a much closer case.  Managerial responsibilities, at least in 
theory, never cease under the concurrent-duties framework—thus 
eviscerating the divide between exempt and nonexempt work.96  Ac-
cordingly, the fact that the Morgan court did not find that the Family 
Dollar store managers could perform their managerial and nonma-
nagerial tasks concurrently is significant. 
On the relative-importance prong, the Eleventh Circuit in Morgan 
found that Family Dollar store managers’ nonmanagerial tasks “were 
of equal or greater importance to a store’s functioning and success” 
than their managerial ones.97  Like the Burger King and Speedway 
courts, the Morgan court isolated success as the variable that should be 
 
94 Id. at 1273. 
95 672 F.2d 221, 226 (1st Cir. 1982).  To buttress its reasoning, the First Circuit 
cited to the DOL regulations which provided an example of an employee who per-
formed both managerial and nonmanagerial functions.  See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. 
§ 541.103 (1981) (amended 2004)) (providing an example of a manager who engages in 
sales work while simultaneously performing managerial supervisory tasks).  The new reg-
ulations contain a separate section entitled “Concurrent Duties.”  See 29 C.F.R. § 541.106 
(2010) (stating explicitly that a manager can have concurrent duties and still be exempt). 
96 For an example of a court that has taken the concept of concurrent duties to its 
logical extreme, see In re Family Dollar FLSA Litig., 637 F.3d 508, 515-17 (4th Cir. 
2011).  The Fourth Circuit stated, “In short, whether the [store manager] was simply 
standing around or stocking shelves, she remained responsible for addressing any 
problem that could arise and did arise during the course of the daily retail operations.”  
Id.  For further discussion, see infra subsection IV.C.2.   
97 Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1270. 
FREDERICK_REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/9/2011  7:22 PM 
2011] Exempt Executives? 297 
used to compare relative importance;98 however, it reached a much 
different conclusion.  While noting that the store managers under-
took managerial duties,99 the court was unconvinced that the perfor-
mance of those duties was more critical to the store’s success than the 
nonmanagerial duties100—an inference that the Sixth Circuit posited 
as virtually incontrovertible in Speedway.101  As previously mentioned, 
the Eleventh Circuit emphasized the sheer amount of manual labor 
performed by Family Dollar store managers and how that was “a key” 
to the company’s “business model.”102  The court ruled that there was 
“ample evidence” to support the jury’s conclusion that the managers’ 
nonexempt duties were more important.103 
Perhaps the greatest divergence between the Morgan court’s 
reasoning and that in Burger King lies in the importance of corpo-
rate policies with regard to the discretionary-powers and freedom-
from-supervision prongs.  As discussed above, the Burger King opi-
nions posited that highly prescriptive corporate policies were a fact 
of modern retail business practices but that employees will almost 
always be able to exert some discretion within that framework.104  
The Morgan court drew a line in its opinion and found that Family 
Dollar’s manuals and corporate directives “micro-managed” the es-
sential functions of its store managers to the point that no mea-
ningful discretion could be exercised.105  The court also expounded 
on the role of the district manager and how he further circum-
scribed what limited management responsibilities the Family Dollar 
store managers did have.106  In summing up its primary-duty analy-
 
98 See id. (comparing Family Dollar store managers’ managerial and nonmanageri-
al duties to determine which “were of equal or greater importance to a store’s function-
ing and success” (emphasis added)). 
99 See id. (“Admittedly, the store managers’ job description includes manageri-
al duties.”). 
100 See id. (noting that the managers’ job description also included nonmanagerial du-
ties and that these were “essential,” not merely “an incidental part of a managerial job”).  
101 See supra text accompanying notes 67-68. 
102 Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1270.  
103 Id. 
104 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
105 See Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1270 (“The manuals and other corporate directives 
micro-managed the days and hours of store operations, the number of key sets for 
each store, who may possess the key sets, entire store layouts, the selection, presenta-
tion, and pricing of merchandise, promotions, payroll budgets, and staffing levels.” 
(emphasis added)).  
106 See id. at 1271 (outlining numerous ways in which district managers actively su-
pervised store managers, including “enforcing the detailed store operating policies,” 
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sis, the court explained, “[A]mple evidence showed that the com-
bination of sweeping corporate micro-management, close district 
manager oversight, and fixed payroll budgets left store managers 
little choice in how to manage their stores and with the primary 
duty of performing manual, not managerial, tasks.”107  The Morgan 
court, in the end, resoundingly affirmed the jury verdict below108 
and in so doing cracked open the door for future store manager 
overtime suits. 
III.  SHAKING UP THE PRIMARY-DUTY ANALYSIS: MORGAN’S 
EFFECT ON DOLLAR GENERAL STORE 
MANAGERS’ OVERTIME SUITS 
While the desire to attribute the divergent holdings of Morgan 
and its sister courts to “materially dissimilar” facts is tempting, it is 
ultimately unconvincing, as emerging Dollar General case law illu-
strates.  Within the past year, numerous district courts have issued 
opinions either granting or denying Dollar General’s motions for 
summary judgment on the question of whether its store managers 
were properly classified as exempt executives.109  Nearly all of these 
managers’ claims were initially certified as a class action in the 
Northern District of Alabama in 2004.110  After years of preliminary 
motions and midway through a 2006 trial on the merits, the judge 
overseeing the case decertified the class because the store manag-
ers were not “similarly situated with respect to damages.”111  The 
claims of individual Dollar General store managers have slowly 
been transferred out of the Northern District of Alabama and have 
begun to make their way through district courts nationwide.112 
 
“closely monitor[ing] each store’s weekly payroll,” and “controll[ing] employee hourly 
rates and pay raises”).  
107 Id. 
108 Id.  For a discussion of the court’s wage-comparison analysis, see infra sub-
section IV.C.3.   
109 See infra note 113. 
110 Brown v. Dologencorp, Inc., No. 02-0673, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 12, 2004) 
(order certifying a nationwide class). 
111 In re Dollar Gen. Corp. Fair Labor Standards Litig., MDL No. 1635, No. 02-
0673, slip op. at 1-2 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 7, 2006) (order on motion to decertify). 
112 A subsequent class action was filed on August 8, 2006, against Dollar General in 
the same court alleging the same FLSA violations and is currently pending.  Complaint 
at 2, Richter v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 06-1537 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 8, 2006).  Judge Scott 
Coogler of the Northern District of Alabama conditionally certified a nationwide class 
on March 23, 2007.  Richter, No. 06-1537, slip op. at 11 (Mar. 23, 2007) (order certify-
ing a nationwide class).    
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District courts are divided on whether these store managers are 
exempt executives as a matter of law.113  Because the facts in these 
cases are not materially dissimilar from one another, I will argue 
that it is not the facts, but rather the way in which courts are inter-
preting the pertinent factors under the primary-duty analysis, that 
is causing these divergent outcomes.  In other words, the Dollar 
General cases demonstrate that, if given identical sets of facts and 
told to apply the executive exemption to them, different judges will 
reach different outcomes.  Some might conclude that Dollar Gen-
eral store managers are exempt as a matter of law, others might 
view the cases as fairly evenly divided, and still others may feel 
strongly that the managers are not exempt. 
 
113 Eleven district court cases have granted summary judgment to Dollar General.  
See Aschenbrenner v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-0153, 2011 WL 2200630, at *1 (D. Neb. 
June 3, 2011); Leonard v. Dolgencorp Inc., No. 10-0057, 2011 WL 2009937, at *10 
(W.D. Ky. May 23, 2011); In re Dollar Gen. Stores FLSA Litig., 766 F. Supp. 2d 631, 650 
(E.D.N.C. 2011); Brown-Harrison v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0116, slip op. at 
17 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2010); Speak v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0124, slip op. 
at 1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2010); Roberts v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0005, 2010 WL 
4806792, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2010); Mayne-Harrison v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 
09-0042, 2010 WL 3717604, at *1 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 17, 2010); Hartman v. Dolgencorp 
of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0009, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Tex. June 24, 2010); Johnson v. DG Re-
tail LLC, No. 08-0123, 2010 WL 1929620, at *1 (D. Utah May 13, 2010); Noble v. Dol-
gencorp, Inc., No. 09-0049, slip op. at 1 (S.D. Miss. May 11, 2010); King v. Dolgencorp, 
Inc., No. 09-0146, slip op. at 1 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2010) (report and recommendation of 
magistrate judge), adopted by No. 09-0146 ( Jun. 17, 2010) (order adopting report and 
recommendation of magistrate judge) 
 Seven district court cases have denied Dollar General’s motions for summary 
judgment.  Jones v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-3020, 2011 WL 2261480, at *20 (N.D. 
Iowa June 8, 2011); Anderson v. Dolgencorp of N.Y., Inc., Nos. 09-0360, 09-0363, 2011 
WL 1770301, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011); Pierce v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 
09-0097, 2011 WL 398366, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2011); Plaunt v. Dolgencorp, Inc., 
Nos. 09-0079, 09-0084, 2010 WL 5158620, at *14 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2010); Kanatzer 
v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0074, 2010 WL 2720788, at *1 (E.D. Mo. July 8, 2010); 
Hale v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0014, 2010 WL 2595313, at *1 (W.D. Va. June 23, 
2010); Myrick v. Dolgencorp, LLC, No. 09-0005, 2010 WL 146874, at *1 (M.D. Ga. 
Jan. 11, 2010). 
 Most of the store managers in these suits worked at Dollar General sometime 
between 1999 and 2004, before the current DOL regulations went into effect in Au-
gust 2004.  Several cases, though, concerned employees under the new regulations.  
See, e.g., Johnson, 2010 WL 1929620, at *1 (stating that the plaintiff became a store 
manager in 2007); King, No. 09-0146, slip op. at 2 (report and recommendation of 
magistrate judge) (noting that the plaintiff became assistant store manager in 2005 
and store manager in 2006).  
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A.  What’s the Difference?  A Detailed Comparison 
of the Facts in the Dollar General Cases 
1.  A Look at the Role of a Dollar General Store Manager: 
Core Managerial and Nonmanagerial Responsibilities 
A comparison of the Dollar General114 cases reveals that they share 
the same essential facts.  The same corporate policies and Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOP) manual dictated the duties that all the 
store managers were to perform.115  Organizationally, the managers 
were overseen by district managers and were the most senior and only 
salaried employees at their stores.116  The job descriptions were uniform, 
outlining the same managerial responsibilities for all store managers.117  
All managers had the opportunity to receive annual performance bo-
nuses,118 and all were evaluated using the same performance criteria.119 
 
114 “Dollar General . . . is a nationwide retail chain of discount, consumable goods, 
such as cleaning supplies, health and beauty aids, foods/snacks, housewares, toys, and 
basic apparel.”  Jones, 2011 WL 2261480, at *1.  Roughly twenty-five percent of these 
goods sell for a dollar or less, with the remaining merchandise typically priced below 
ten dollars.  Id.  Dollar General operates over 9600 stores in thirty-five states through-
out the country.  Store Locations Map, DOLLAR GEN., http://www2.dollargeneral.com/ 
About-Us/pages/store-locations-map.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).  As of October 
2011, Dollar General operated no stores within the jurisdiction of the First Circuit and 
had only Arizona-based stores within the Ninth Circuit.  Id.  
115 See, e.g., Jones, 2011 WL 2261480, at *1 (explaining that Dollar General’s corpo-
rate headquarters provided “detailed operating-procedures manuals to every store 
manager”); Aschenbrenner, 2011 WL 2200630, at *1 (noting that “Dollar General oper-
ated its stores according to uniform Standard Operating Procedure manuals”); Roberts, 
2010 WL 4806792, at *1 (“All Dollar General stores are operated according to a uni-
form Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) manual distributed by Dollar General’s 
corporate offices.”). 
116 See, e.g., Anderson, 2011 WL 1770301, at *1 (finding that store managers “occupy 
the highest level of supervisory authority and are the only employees paid on a salaried 
basis” at their store and “report[] to a District Manager”); Johnson, 2010 WL 1929620, 
at *1-2 (explaining that the store manager was the “only salaried employee at the 
store,” “the boss of the store,” and “reported to a District Manager”).  
117 See, e.g., Anderson, 2011 WL 1770301, at *1-2 (compiling essential duties listed in 
the Dollar General store manager job description); Plaunt, 2010 WL 5158620, at *2 
(listing duties that plaintiff, had, which were the same duties as those listed in Ander-
son); Mayne-Harrison, 2010 WL 3717604, at *8 (same).  
118 See, e.g., Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *1 (stating that “all [Dollar General] store 
managers . . . are eligible for a bonus”); Myrick, 2010 WL 146874, at *7 (noting that the 
plaintiff store manager had earned several bonuses for her job performance while 
working at Dollar General).  
119 Dollar General divided these performance criteria into seven categories:  sales 
volume, safety awareness, loss prevention (or “inventory shrink”), training and devel-
opment, controllable expenses, customer satisfaction, and merchandising.  Aschenbren-
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While the store managers offered varied testimony about the 
amount of time spent on nonexempt work—with some claiming they 
allocated upwards of ninety percent of their time to such duties120—all 
spent at least a majority of their time performing nonmanagerial tasks 
like cleaning, stocking shelves, and working the cash register.121  
Alongside the nonexempt manual labor they performed, Dollar Gen-
eral store managers undertook numerous core managerial responsi-
bilities as provided in the company’s uniform job description.122  These 
responsibilities can be split into two key functional areas:  (1) assembling 
and supervising store staff and (2) overseeing store operations. 
On the staffing side, the store managers recruited, interviewed, 
and hired new employees, although they typically could not hire more 
senior personnel, like assistant managers, without getting approval 
from their district managers.123  Once new employees were hired, store 
managers trained and evaluated them, and recommended deserving 
employees for raises and promotions.124  Store managers also informed 
employees of the expectations regarding their performance, conduct, 
 
ner, 2011 WL 2200630, at *2; accord Anderson, 2011 WL 1770301, at *2; Mayne-Harrison, 
2010 WL 3717604, at *21.   
120 See, e.g., Jones, 2011 WL 2261480, at *2 (explaining that the plaintiff store man-
ager allegedly spent “only ten percent” of her time on managerial tasks); Kanatzer v. 
Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0074, 2010 WL 2720788, at *2 (E.D. Mo. July 8, 2010) (“Ac-
cording to Kanatzer, she spends nearly all of her time—up to 90% of her time—
on . . . manual duties . . . .”); Hale v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0014, 2010 WL 2595313, at 
*3 (W.D. Va. June 23, 2010) (observing that the plaintiff store manager claimed to 
have “spent ten percent of her time, about six hours each week, performing man-
agement duties”).  
121 See, e.g., Leonard v. Dolgencorp Inc., No. 10-0057, 2011 WL 2009937, at *6 
(W.D. Ky. May 23, 2011)  (“Leonard spends about 70% of her time on manual labor or 
non-management issues.”); Plaunt, 2010 WL 5158620, at *7 (“While it is not clear what 
percentage of Plaunt’s time was spent on managerial tasks, we will assume she spent 
less than 50% of her time performing purely managerial tasks.”); Johnson, 2010 WL 
1929620, at *3 (noting that the plaintiff store manager spent between seventy and 
eighty percent of her time on nonmanagerial work).  
122 See cases cited supra note 117.    
123 See, e.g., Jones, 2011 WL 2261480, at *15 (commenting that the store manager 
“was responsible for taking applications, reviewing applications, interviewing job appli-
cants, checking references, selecting, and hiring certain employees”); Leonard, 2011 
WL 2009937, at *2 (finding that the store manager spent roughly five percent of her 
work week “reviewing [job] applications, evaluating them and deciding on call backs, 
conducting interviews, and finally making a hiring recommendation”). 
124 See, e.g., Aschenbrenner, 2011 WL 2200630, at *4 (asserting that the store manag-
er was responsible for “training and ongoing development of employees,” as well as 
“making recommendations for adjustments to [their] pay rates”); Plaunt, 2010 WL 
5158620, at *2 (finding that the plaintiff store manager “trained[,] evaluated[,] and 
counseled employees” and “recommended [them] for pay raises and promotions”). 
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and safety,125 as well as set staff schedules and assigned work to em-
ployees.126  While store managers did not have the power to suspend or 
fire employees, they could recommend that the district manager do 
so.127  On the business operations side, store managers were responsible 
for maximizing store profitability by, among other things, keeping the 
shelves stocked with merchandise,128 reducing inventory loss,129 and 
maintaining cash control.130  In addition, they oversaw the unloading 
and display of merchandise131 and dealt with customer complaints.132 
 
125 See, e.g., Anderson v. Dolgencorp of N.Y., Inc., Nos. 09-0360, 09-0363, 2011 WL 
1770301, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011) (listing the communication of “performance, 
conduct and safety expectations” to employees as an essential job function of the store 
manager); King v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0146, slip op. at 5 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2010) 
(report and recommendation of magistrate judge) (noting that the store manager 
held regular store meetings “to communicate to employees how to do their job; to dis-
cuss ongoing problems in the store; to air grievances; and to announce and explain 
new policies”), adopted by No. 09-0146 (June 17, 2010) (order adopting report and 
recommendation of magistrate judge). 
126 See, e.g., In re Dollar Gen. Stores FLSA Litig., 766 F. Supp. 2d 631, 644 (E.D.N.C. 
2011) (finding that the store manager “directed the work of her employees by schedul-
ing when they would work and by assigning or delegating daily tasks to them”); Ka-
natzer v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0074, 2010 WL 2720788, at *4 (E.D. Mo. July 8, 
2010) (explaining that, while the store manager “schedule[d] employee work shifts” 
and “assign[ed] tasks to the other employees at the store,” corporate dictates con-
strained her discretion in doing so). 
127 See, e.g., Roberts v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0005, 2010 WL 4806792, at *2 
(M.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2010) (“[W]hile authority to terminate employees rested with 
the district manager, Roberts . . . made termination recommendations to her district 
manager.”); Kanatzer, 2010 WL 2720788, at *1 (mentioning that if an employee se-
riously misbehaves, then the store manager “must report it to the district manager, 
who then takes responsibility for the situation”). 
128 See, e.g., Aschenbrenner, 2011 WL 2200630, at *4 (listing “directing the flow of 
merchandise from the back door delivery to the sales floor” as a job performed by the 
store manager); Plaunt, 2010 WL 5158620, at *2 (explaining that the store manager 
“facilitated efficient staging, stocking, and storage of merchandise”). 
129 See, e.g., Plaunt, 2010 WL 5158620, at *2 (finding that the store manager “eva-
luated operating statements to identify . . . potential theft” and “maintained accurate 
inventory levels by controlling damage [and] markdowns”); Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, 
at *3 (explaining that the store manager played a “key role in reducing ‘shrinkage,’ or 
avoiding loss” by “ensuring that vendors were honoring their delivery obligations, pre-
venting shoplifting, ensuring that her employees were not stealing, and marking down 
damaged merchandise, rather than simply throwing it away”). 
130 See, e.g., Leonard v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-0057, 2011 WL 2009937, at *3 
(W.D. Ky. May 23, 2011) (“Leonard was responsible for proper cash handling proce-
dures at her store and would monitor daily reports showing cashier shortages, voids 
and refunds.”); Anderson, 2011 WL 1770301, at *3 (listing “ensuring that cash registers 
‘balanced’” as one of the store manager’s duties). 
131 See, e.g., Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *4 (explaining that hundreds of boxes of 
inventory arrived on “truck day” every week and that the store manager facilitated the 
unloading and stocking of merchandise on these days); Hale v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 
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Standard operating procedures within Dollar General, however, 
limited the degree of managerial discretion that the store managers 
could exercise.  When scheduling employees, store managers had to 
adhere to the weekly labor budget set by district managers.133  The 
weekly “truck day”—the day each week when a store’s inventory would 
arrive—typically consumed the majority of the labor budget as hun-
dreds of boxes134 had to be unloaded and unpacked, and then the 
merchandise stocked or stored.135  Store managers could not set the 
pay rate of their employees,136 could not hire “key-carrying” person-
nel, such as associate managers and lead clerks,137 and could not fire 
subordinates.138 
Store managers exerted minimal control over the type and quanti-
ty of products sold in their stores, as an automated inventory system 
 
09-0014, 2010 WL 2595313, at *3 (W.D. Va. June 23, 2010) (noting that the store 
manager was responsible for “unload[ing] supply trucks and plac[ing] merchan-
dise on the store floors”).  
132 See, e.g., Pierce v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0097, 2011 WL 398366, at 
*2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2011) (commenting that the store manager “handled customer 
complaints if another employee could not resolve” the issue). 
133 See, e.g., Jones v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-3020, 2011 WL 2261480, at *1 (N.D. 
Iowa June 8, 2011) (“District managers strictly control[ed] the number of labor hours 
given to each store, and their approval [was] required before a store’s labor budget 
[could be] exceeded by the store manager.”); In re Dollar Gen. Stores FLSA Litig., 766 
F. Supp. 2d 631, 635 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (explaining that the district manager “handed 
down a labor budget . . . each week”). 
134 See, e.g., In re Dollar Gen. Stores, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 635 (explaining that “[t]he 
store would get one truck delivery per week and would receive about 1200 or more 
boxes of merchandise”); Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *4 (stating that “[s]tores gener-
ally received between 800 and 1200 boxes of merchandise on truck day”).  
135 See, e.g., In re Dollar Gen. Stores, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 635 (“The majority of the la-
bor budget was spent on truck day and the day after, which did not leave many hours 
to schedule for the rest of the week.”); Hale, 2010 WL 2595313, at *3 (describing how 
the store manager would “save her staff’s hours for truck day so merchandise could be 
placed in the store within twenty-four hours” and how, as a result, the store operated 
with a “skeleton crew” for the remainder of the week).   
136 See, e.g., Aschenbrenner v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-0153, 2011 WL 2200630, at 
*16 (D. Neb. June 3, 2011) (noting that the plaintiff could not “set[] the initial pay 
rate of employees”); Plaunt v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0084, 2010 WL 
5158620, at *14 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2010) (same).  
137 See, e.g., Jones, 2011 WL 2261480, at *15 (stating that plaintiff “was not permit-
ted to hire a full-time, key-carrying employee without the district manager’s approval”); 
Leonard v. Dolgencorp Inc., No. 10-0057, 2011 WL 2009937, at *1 (W.D. Ky. May 23, 
2011) (reporting that “interview[ing] applicants for ‘key carrier positions’” was the dis-
trict manager’s duty). 
138 See cases cited supra note 127.  
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handled the bulk of merchandise ordering.139  “Plan-O-Grams” dic-
tated where and how to display much, if not all, of a store’s merchan-
dise.140  Dollar General’s SOP manuals further delineated how store 
managers were to complete certain tasks, such as “how to answer the tel-
ephone while also running the cash register, what items should be hung 
on a clipboard in the store’s office, how to handle weather emergencies, 
and what steps should be taken to ensure the floor was clean.”141 
District managers typically supervised between fifteen to twenty-five 
store managers at a time142 and would check up on stores in person 
roughly every month and stay anywhere from between several minutes 
to several hours.143  District managers also tended to leave daily or week-
ly voicemail messages instructing store managers on certain issues.144 
2.  Weekly Salaries and Bonuses:  Some Differences, 
but Not Any of Significance 
Dollar General store managers’ weekly salaries and annual bonuses 
exhibited much greater divergence than did their managerial and non-
managerial responsibilities and the manner in which their district 
managers treated them.  Managers’ weekly salaries overwhelmingly 
 
139 See, e.g., In re Dollar Gen. Stores, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 643 (explaining that “store mer-
chandise is automatically ordered by Dollar General’s Basic Stock Replenishment Sys-
tem”); Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *3 (“[S]tore managers have virtually no control over 
the specific merchandise that is sold in the store, and the vast majority of ‘purchasing’ for 
the store is done by an automatic system that orders more of a good as it is sold.”). 
140 See, e.g., Mayne-Harrison v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0042, 2010 WL 3717604, 
at *13 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 17, 2010) (noting that a “planogram” directs where “most” 
merchandise must be placed in the store, with placement of ninety percent of seasonal 
products being determined in such a manner by Dollar General’s corporate office); 
Hale, 2010 WL 2595313, at *3 (“Typically, ninety percent of Hale’s store was organized 
according to the Plan-O-Gram . . . .”). 
141 Aschenbrenner, 2011 WL 2200630, at *15; accord Jones, 2011 WL 2261480, at *1. 
142 See, e.g., Anderson v. Dolgencorp of N.Y., Inc., Nos. 09-0360, 09-0363, 2011 WL 
1770301, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011) (noting that district managers “over[saw] from 
fifteen to twenty-five stores”); Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *2 (describing how the 
plaintiff’s district manager “generally oversaw between 16-18 stores”).   
143 See, e.g., Speak v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0124, slip op. at 13 (N.D. 
Tex. Dec. 28, 2010) (observing that the district manager visited the plaintiff’s store 
about twice a month and that these visits were “typically only a few hours long”); Hale, 
2010 WL 2595313, at *4 (explaining that the district manager visited the store manag-
er’s location “once every few months for twenty to thirty minutes”). 
144 See, e.g., Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *2 (noting that the district manager left 
“regular, often daily,” voicemails for the store manager); Mayne-Harrison, 2010 WL 
3717604, at *3 (stating that the store manager received voicemail messages from the 
district manager “at least three times a week”). 
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fell between $400 and $600,145 with a range of $313 to $768.146  Nota-
bly, the store manager earning the most per week ($768) managed to 
overcome Dollar General’s summary judgment motion.147  More gen-
erally, though, the differences in salary are inconsequential because 
(1) the salaries for those store managers who prevailed against Dollar 
General at the summary judgment phase and those who did not were 
roughly the same on average,148 and (2) even if they were not, salaries 
are only considered under the wage-comparison prong of the primary-
duty test—a prong that the Dollar General courts only marginally con-
sidered and gave little, if any, weight.149 
Whether and how much store managers received in bonuses con-
stitutes the most variable aspect among Dollar General cases.  In some 
instances, store managers received no bonuses.150  In others, they re-
ceived bonuses worth thousands of dollars.151  Bonuses in and of them-
selves, however, have no significance.  Like store managers’ weekly 
salaries, bonuses only enter the primary-duty picture when courts con-
sider the wage-comparison prong. 
 
145 See, e.g., Jones, 2011 WL 2261480, at *2 (explaining that the store manager’s 
weekly salary ranged from $440 to $515); Johnson v. DG Retail LLC, No. 08-0123, 2010 
WL 1929620, at *3 (D. Utah May 13, 2010) (noting that the store manager received a 
weekly salary of $538.40); King v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0146, slip op. at 27 (M.D. 
Pa. May 6, 2010) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge) (stating that the 
store manager earned a weekly salary between $490 and $500 during her tenure with 
Dollar General), adopted by No. 09-0146 ( June 17, 2010) (order adopting report and 
recommendation of magistrate judge).  
146 See Kanatzer v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0074, 2010 WL 2720788, at *2 (E.D. Mo. 
July 8, 2010) (stating that the store manager’s salary was $768 per week); Hale, 2010 WL 
2595313, at *3 (noting that the store manager’s weekly salary was $313 at one point).   
147 See Kanatzer, 2010 WL 2720788, at *5 (“Viewing Kanatzer’s job as a whole, Dol-
gencorp has not shown that Kanatzer is exempt.”). 
148 The average weekly salary of store managers who prevailed against Dollar Gener-
al’s summary judgment motions was $489, and their median weekly salary was $464.  For 
store managers who did not, both the average weekly salary and median weekly salary was 
$495.  This translates into a $312 average or $1612 median annual salary difference.  
These averages and medians incorporated bonuses earned by the store managers. 
149 See infra subsection IV.C.3. 
150 See, e.g., Plaunt v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0084, 2010 WL 5158620, 
at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2010) (stating that the store manager “never earned . . . a bo-
nus”); Noble v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0049, slip op. at 3 (S.D. Miss. May 11, 2010) 
(explaining that the store manager “was eligible for bonuses throughout her employ-
ment but never received one”).  
151 See, e.g., Pierce v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0097, 2011 WL 398366, at 
*1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2011) (noting that in 2002 the store manager received a bonus of 
$7150.25 to share with store staff); Roberts v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0005, 2010 WL 
4806792, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2010) (highlighting that the store manager re-
ceived bonuses of $7071 and $9271 in 2001 and 2002, respectively). 
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Although bonuses did vary, they were spread out rather evenly 
among cases where summary judgment was granted and where it was 
not.  For those store managers whose claims did not survive summary 
judgment, seven received a bonus152 and two did not,153 while three 
cases are unclear as to whether the manager earned a bonus.154  For 
those managers whose claims survived summary judgment, four re-
ceived a bonus155 and one did not,156 while courts in two cases made no 
mention of bonuses.157  Moreover, the Hartman, King, Roberts, In re Dol-
lar General, and Mayne-Harrison courts, which all granted summary 
judgment to Dollar General, did not fully factor whether store man-
agers earned a bonus into their primary-duty analyses.158  All in all, 
 
152 See Aschenbrenner v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-0153, 2011 WL 2200630, at *19 
(D. Neb. June 3, 2011); Leonard v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-0057, 2011 WL 2009937, 
at *3 (W.D. Ky. May 23, 2011); In re Dollar Gen. Stores FLSA Litig., 766 F. Supp. 2d 
631, 633 (E.D.N.C. 2011); Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *1; Mayne-Harrison v. Dolgen-
corp, Inc., No. 09-0042, 2010 WL 3717604, at *2 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 17, 2010); Hart-
man v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0009 (N.D. Tex. June 24, 2010); King v. Dol-
gencorp, Inc., No. 09-0146, slip op. at 14 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2010) (report and 
recommendation of magistrate judge), adopted by No. 09-0146 (June 17, 2010) (order 
adopting report and recommendation of magistrate judge). 
153 See Johnson v. DG Retail LLC, No. 08-0123, 2010 WL 1929620, at *1 (D. Utah 
May 13, 2010); Noble, No. 09-0049, slip op. at 3. 
154 See In re Dollar Gen. Stores, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 635-36 (E.D.N.C. 2011); Brown-
Harrison v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0116, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 
2010); Speak v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0124, slip op. at 8 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 
2010).  The In re Dollar General Stores case involved two store managers’ claims.  The case 
notes that one of these managers received bonuses but says nothing about the other.   
155 See Jones v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-3020, 2011 WL 2261480, at *2 (N.D. Iowa 
June 8, 2011); Pierce, 2011 WL 398366, at *1; Hale v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0014, 
2010 WL 2595313, at *3 (W.D. Va. June 23, 2010); Myrick v. Dolgencorp, LLC, No. 09-
0005, 2010 WL 146874, at *7 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2010). 
156 See Plaunt v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0084, 2010 WL 5158620, at *1 
(M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2010). 
157 See Anderson v. Dolgencorp of N.Y., Inc., Nos. 09-0360, 09-0363, 2011 WL 
1770301, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011); Kanatzer v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0074, 
2010 WL 2720788 (E.D. Mo. July 8, 2010). 
158 The Hartman court mentioned that the store manager had received bonuses, 
but then did not incorporate that fact into the wage-comparison prong of the primary-
duty analysis.  Hartman v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0009, slip op. at 12 (N.D. 
Tex. June 24, 2010). The King court calculated the wage differential between the store 
manager and her assistant both with and without bonuses and determined that the dif-
ference was significant, even excluding bonuses from the calculation.  King v. Dolgen-
corp, Inc., No. 09-0146, slip op. at 1, 27-28 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2010) (report and rec-
ommendation of magistrate judge), adopted by No. 09-0146 ( June 17, 2010) (order 
adopting report and recommendation of magistrate judge).  Following the Sixth Cir-
cuit in Speedway, the Roberts court decided that it “should estimate weekly hours on the 
low end, to compensate for the fact that the plaintiff was eligible for a bonus.”  Roberts 
v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0005, 2010 WL 4806792, at *10 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 
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bonuses played an insignificant, if not nonexistent, role in the Dollar 
General cases. 
B.  It’s Not About the Facts:  It’s About Burger King and Morgan 
The ongoing Dollar General litigation pits the contrasting modes 
of reasoning displayed in the Burger King cases and Morgan against one 
another.  A Burger King, Murray, or Speedway quote is likely to be found 
in those opinions granting summary judgment to Dollar General, 
while Morgan reigns as the supreme authority for those courts denying 
summary judgment. 
In assessing the relative importance of managerial versus nonma-
nagerial duties, courts finding Dollar General store managers exempt 
as a matter of law determined that the performance of managerial du-
ties was more critical to the success of their store.  Some treated the is-
sue summarily,159 while others explored the relative-importance prong 
in greater depth.  The Eastern District of North Carolina presented 
the most thorough analysis and pointed to the plaintiff’s own testimo-
ny, her job description listing oversight responsibilities, her evalua-
tions based on store performance, and her opportunity for bonuses 
based on store success.160  In stating their conclusions, a number of 
 
2010).  The plaintiff estimated that she worked between forty-five and eighty hours per 
week, so the court calculated her hourly wage based on a fifty-hour work week.  Id.  
While the Mayne-Harrison and In re Dollar General courts factored bonuses into the 
wage-comparison analysis, they determined that the store manager in each case “was 
making more, or at least the same, in her management positions as nonexempt em-
ployees.”  In re Dollar Gen. Stores, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 648-49 (quoting Jones v. Va. Oil Co., 
69 Fed. App’x 633, 639 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord 
Mayne-Harrison v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0042, 2010 WL 3717604, at *23 (N.D. W. Va. 
Sept. 17, 2010).  The courts’ statements suggest that it was more the wage-comparison 
approach they undertook than the bonuses themselves that drove their conclusions.  For 
instance, the Morgan court would have found that a manager making the same amount as 
a nonexempt employee tilted in favor of finding the manager nonexempt—in other 
words, the opposite of what the Mayne-Harrison and In re Dollar General courts found.          
159 See, e.g., Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *9 (“In light of . . . the clear language of 
Speedway, the court must conclude that the plaintiff’s managerial role was ‘much more 
important’ than her non-managerial role.” (quoting Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmeri-
ca, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 505 (6th Cir. 2007))). 
160 In re Dollar Gen. Stores, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 640-43; see also Mayne-Harrison, 2010 
WL 3717604, at *21 (commenting that plaintiff was “the one in charge at the store”); 
Johnson v. DG Retail LLC, No. 08-0123, 2010 WL 1929620, at *4 (D. Utah May 13, 
2010) (evaluating plaintiff on managerial skills and profitability of store and noting 
that she was “ultimately in charge” and “the boss” of the store); King, No. 09-0146, slip 
op. at 20-23 (report and recommendation of magistrate judge) (pointing to plaintiff’s 
performance review, her testimony, and her job description as evidence that her ma-
nagerial duties were more important). 
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courts borrowed the language used in the Sixth Circuit’s Speedway 
opinion; for instance, in King v. Dolgencorp, Inc., the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania held:  “If [the] plaintiff did not perform her nonmana-
gerial duties, her Dollar General store may not have functioned well; 
but if she did not perform her managerial duties, the store would have 
been incapable of doing business.”161 
Meanwhile, those district courts that denied Dollar General’s mo-
tion for summary judgment reached the conclusion that reasonable 
minds could disagree about whether managerial or nonmanagerial 
duties were of greater importance.162  What stood out most prominent-
ly to these courts was the overwhelming portion of a store manager’s 
work day that nonmanagerial duties consumed.163  Much like the Mor-
gan court, these courts placed great weight on this vast disparity in 
time allocation between exempt and nonexempt work.  As such, it was 
unclear whether store managers’ managerial or nonmanagerial duties 
were more important.  Several courts also pointed to the fact that 
these managers shared many similar responsibilities with the assistant 
manager, thus devaluing the significance of these managerial duties in 
the courts’ eyes.164 
 
161 King, No. 09-0146, slip op. at 23 (report and recommendation of magistrate 
judge); see also Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *9 (“As in Speedway, if the plaintiff did not 
[perform her nonmanagerial tasks,] the performance of the store would certainly be 
adversely affected; however, if she did not [do her managerial tasks,] the store would 
cease to function at all.”); Mayne-Harrison, 2010 WL 3717604, at *21 (“If Mayne-
Harrison had not performed her nonmanagerial tasks her store may not have per-
formed well; but if she had not performed her managerial functions . . . the store 
would not have operated at all.”). 
162 See, e.g., Jones v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-3020, 2011 WL 2261480, at *14 (N.D. 
Iowa June 8, 2011) (finding that Dollar General had “failed to meet [its] burden of 
establishing no genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether Joyner’s ma-
nagerial duties were more important . . . than her non-managerial duties”); Pierce v. 
Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0097, 2011 WL 398366, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 
2011) (“A reasonable jury could conclude . . . that Dolgencorp valued Pierce’s manual 
labor more highly than her managerial functions.”).  
163 See, e.g., Jones, 2011 WL 2261480, at *14 (“While it is true that Joyner was respon-
sible, as a store manager, for ensuring the store’s profitability, she was also responsible for 
performing a substantial amount of the manual labor necessary to ensure its profitabili-
ty . . . .”); Anderson v. Dolgencorp of N.Y., Inc., Nos. 09-0360, 09-0363, 2011 WL 1770301, 
at *11 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011) (finding the “restrictiveness with which Dollar Gener-
al . . . allot[ted] its labor budget” as “most significant[]” for why summary judgment was 
inappropriate on the relative-importance prong of the primary-duty test). 
164 See Plaunt v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0084, 2010 WL 5158620, at *8 
(M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2010) (“A reasonable jury could, however, also conclude that, given 
the fact that Plaunt’s ASM had a similar job description . . . that if Plaunt did not per-
form her managerial functions the store would have continued to operate, albeit less 
efficiently.”); Myrick v. Dolgencorp, LLC, No. 09-0005, 2010 WL 146874, at *5 n.7 
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The crux of the disagreement between these district courts, like in 
Burger King I and II and Morgan, centers on the discretionary-powers 
prong and what effect, if any, corporate policies have on store manag-
ers’ ability to exercise managerial discretion.  Those courts holding 
managers exempt did not find corporate strictures problematic, while 
those that rejected Dollar General’s motions did.  Among those grant-
ing summary judgment, the Roberts court, for example, noted that 
“‘stringent’ oversight and ‘detailed company policies and standardized 
operating procedures’ are not fatal to the employer’s primary duty ar-
gument.”165  The court went on to find that the plaintiff had discretion 
to run the store on a day-to-day basis and listed a number of areas in 
which she exercised that discretion.166  In contrast, the court in Ka-
natzer v. Dolgencorp., Inc., found that the plaintiff’s discretion in mana-
gerial duties was “substantially limited by company policies and the 
oversight of her supervisors.”167  Likewise, the district court in Hale v. 
Dolgencorp, Inc., determined that a juror could find that the plaintiff 
exercised only infrequent discretion,168 while in Myrick v. Dolgencorp, 
LLC, the district court noted that the plaintiff did not feel she had 
discretion to run the store.169 
IV.  A LOPSIDED AFFAIR:  REBALANCING AN EXEMPTION 
THAT UNDULY FAVORS RETAIL EMPLOYERS 
OVER THEIR STORE MANAGERS 
As these district court opinions reveal, Dollar General store man-
agers represent a class of workers who fall squarely on the dividing 
line between overtime exemption and nonexemption.  On the one 
hand, these managers undeniably undertook managerial duties, were 
evaluated on how well they performed those duties, and could be re-
warded with bonuses if their stores met certain performance criteria.  
Although limited by corporate policy, these managers were largely re-
sponsible for what happened on a day-to-day basis at their stores.  Dis-
trict managers kept tabs on what these managers were doing, but only 
visited in person from time to time.  On the other hand, Dollar Gen-
 
(M.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2010) (“It should also be noted that many of Myrick’s managerial 
tasks were also performed by non-salaried employees.”). 
165 Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *9 (quoting Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, 
LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
166 Id. at *9.  
167 No. 09-0074, 2010 WL 2720788, at *4 (E.D. Mo. July 8, 2010). 
168 No. 09-0014, 2010 WL 2595313, at *5 (W.D. Va. June 23, 2010). 
169 2010 WL 146874, at *5. 
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eral store managers also spent significant portions of their time per-
forming menial tasks.  It is unclear, then, whether the managerial du-
ties or the sheer amount of grunt work expected of these workers was 
more critical to the store’s success.  Similarly, the discretion exercised 
by the store managers could be characterized as severely circum-
scribed and insignificant.  Also, the store managers were arguably not 
free from supervision, as the district managers could monitor the 
stores’ performance remotely and intervene if necessary. 
Despite the compelling case for nonexemption, the governing con-
tours of the executive exemption—initially outlined in Burger King II 
and further refined in the updated DOL regulations—overwhelmingly 
favor Dollar General.  The Fourth Circuit’s ruling in In re Family Dollar 
FLSA Litigation,170 with which it joined the Burger King II bandwagon, 
leaves little doubt that district courts denying summary judgment to 
Dollar General stand a sizeable risk of being overturned on appeal.  
While technically speaking the legal burden to prove the executive ex-
emption falls on the employer—since the exemption is an affirmative 
defense to paying overtime wages—and the exemption is to be narrowly 
construed,171 store managers bear the burden of overcoming decades of 
appellate precedent denying fellow managers overtime pay. 
A.  Tightening the Noose on Retail Supervisors’ Overtime Claims: 
The Anticipated Effect of the Updated DOL Regulations 
Going forward, retail supervisors will also have to surmount the 
2004 revisions to the DOL regulations, which, while not altering the 
executive exemption significantly, codify circuit case law unfavorable 
to overtime claims.  The current regulations, for instance, minimize 
the importance of the time-allotment prong of the primary-duty analy-
sis.  Like the previous regulations, the current ones explain that 
“[t]ime alone . . . is not the sole test” but add that “nothing in this sec-
tion requires that exempt employees spend more than 50 percent of 
their time performing exempt work.”172  The updated regulations pro-
vide an illustrative example directed at retail supervisors: 
 
170 637 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 2011). 
171 Cf. A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (noting in discussing 
another FLSA exemption that “[t]o extend an exemption to other than those plainly 
and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the interpretative process and 
to frustrate the announced will of the people”). 
172 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(b) (2010).  This section goes on to explain:  “Employees 
who do not spend more than 50 percent of their time performing exempt duties may 
nonetheless meet the primary duty requirement if the other factors support such a 
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[A]ssistant managers in a retail establishment who perform exempt ex-
ecutive work such as supervising and directing the work of other em-
ployees, ordering merchandise, managing the budget and authorizing 
payment of bills may have management as their primary duty even if the 
assistant managers spend more than 50 percent of the time performing 
nonexempt work such as running the cash register.
173
   
The significance of this additional clause and illustration is to shift the 
primary-duty analysis even more overtly to the other pertinent factors 
delineated in the regulations. 
Drawing heavily on the Burger King cases and in contrast to their 
predecessors, the current regulations introduce the idea of “concur-
rent duties.”  The term “concurrent duties” essentially means that an 
employee can perform both managerial and nonmanagerial duties 
simultaneously, a notion that makes it difficult to separate managerial 
from nonmanagerial responsibilities for primary-duty purposes.  The 
regulations provide, “Generally, exempt executives make the decision 
regarding when to perform nonexempt duties and remain responsible 
for the success or failure of business operations under their manage-
ment while performing the nonexempt work.”174  Similar to the time-
allocation provisions, an example—again directed at retail supervi-
sors—offers insight into how the regulation might be applied: 
[A]n assistant manager in a retail establishment may perform work such as 
serving customers, cooking food, stocking shelves and cleaning the estab-
lishment, but performance of such nonexempt work does not preclude 
the exemption if the assistant manager’s primary duty is management.  An 
assistant manager can supervise employees and serve customers at the 
same time without losing the exemption.  An exempt employee can also 
simultaneously direct the work of other employees and stock shelves.
175
 
Such a broad understanding of what constitutes concurrent duties 
complicates low-level supervisors’ requests for overtime pay. 
Perhaps the most significant change to the executive-exemption 
test is that the discretionary-powers prong has been dropped from the 
primary-duty analysis.  As the Morgan opinion and those district court 
opinions denying Dollar General summary judgment exemplify, this 
 
conclusion.”  Id.  The former regulations, by contrast, provided:  “Time alone . . . is not 
the sole test, and in situations where the employee does not spend over 50 percent of 
his time in managerial duties, he might nevertheless have management as his primary 
duty if the other pertinent factors support such a conclusion.”  29 C.F.R. § 541.103 
(2003) (amended 2004).   
173 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(c) (2010).   
174 Id. § 541.106(a). 
175 Id. § 541.106(b). 
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prong offered courts significant leeway in how to interpret the facts at 
hand.  Some courts—most notably the Eleventh Circuit—have already 
decided to fold the issue of discretion into the freedom-from-
supervision prong.176  Still, the removal of this factor from those listed 
in the regulations makes it equally, if not more, likely that, going for-
ward, discretion will play less and less of a role in determining an em-
ployee’s primary duty.  Such a change will make it that much harder 
for retail supervisors to prevail on their overtime claims. 
B.  Moving Beyond Burger King:  The Call for a More 
Dynamic Primary-Duty Inquiry 
While the forecast for Dollar General–type store managers’ over-
time suits looks gloomy, especially after the Fourth Circuit’s In re Fami-
ly Dollar ruling,177 it is important to remember that the DOL regula-
tions call for a case-by-case application of the executive exemption 
and that the outcome in a particular case ultimately hinges on an 
individual judge’s weighing of the primary-duty factors.  The DOL 
regulations and prevailing circuit precedent undoubtedly tilt the bal-
ance in favor of employers and exemption and seriously circumscribe 
 
176 The Eleventh Circuit in Morgan explicitly took this position:  “Having discretio-
nary power is one aspect of freedom from supervision.”  Morgan v. Family Dollar 
Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1270 n.57 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009).  
The court highlighted that the current regulations require a primary-duty determina-
tion “to be made ‘with the major emphasis on the character of the employee’s job as a 
whole.’”  Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a) (2006)).  The court concluded that “the 
new regulations do not preclude, and are consistent with, our consideration of the fre-
quency with which an employee exercises discretionary powers in our primary duty 
analysis.”  Id.; see also Roberts v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0005, 2010 WL 4806792, at *9 
(M.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2010) (noting that while the new regulations omit the discretio-
nary-powers prong, “issues of manager authority and control remain centrally relevant” 
to the primary-duty analysis). 
177 An opinion coming after In re Family Dollar—by the same Western District of 
Virginia judge who denied Dollar General’s summary judgment motion in Hale v. Dol-
gencorp, Inc.—portends the negative impact the Fourth Circuit’s opinion will have on 
overtime claims.  In reviewing the proposed settlement agreements between Hale and 
other store managers with Dollar General, the judge noted that the settlement 
amounts were “significantly less than the amount of back wages and liquidated damag-
es claimed” and that the “claims, if believed by a jury, might reasonably result in a ver-
dict for the plaintiff[s].”  Taylor v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0002, 2011 WL 1626557, at 
*1 (W.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2011).  While the judge pointed to his Hale opinion to demon-
strate the legitimacy of the plaintiffs’ overtime claims, he also conceded that the 
Fourth Circuit’s In re Family Dollar opinion “on similar facts” had “substantially under-
cut [his] decision.”  Id.  Were the judge confronted with another Dollar General case, 
his analysis would likely differ from that in Hale and the outcome very well could be 
summary dismissal of the manager’s claims. 
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the ambit of lower courts’ judicial interpretation.  Though taut, the 
noose around low-level retail supervisors’ overtime claims has not en-
tirely strangled judges’ ability to construe the primary-duty factors in a 
way that levels the playing field between employer and employee.  For 
instance, in individual cases, courts must resolve a series of interpreta-
tive questions:  How should the relative importance of managerial and 
nonmanagerial duties be determined?  How significantly, if at all, do 
detailed corporate policies curtail managerial discretion?  How great 
must the difference be between managers’ wages and those of subor-
dinates for the wage-comparison prong to weigh in favor of exemp-
tion?  And, in the end, how should all of these factors be balanced?  Are 
there any that should be given more weight than others?  The way in 
which district judges analyze and measure these considerations can make 
the difference between store managers’ being found exempt as a matter 
of law and getting an opportunity to put their cases before a jury.178 
One would imagine that district courts in circuits that have defini-
tively pronounced on these questions in favor of exemption, like the 
First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, would adhere to the 
appellate courts’ interpretative approach.  At least in the ongoing Dol-
lar General litigation, that has not always been the case.179  District 
courts in both the Second and Eighth Circuits have denied Dollar Gen-
eral’s summary judgment motions despite the Burger King II and Murray 
precedents, respectively, that seemingly settled how the primary-duty 
analysis should be done.180  The Northern District of New York in An-
 
178 At least in the Dollar General cases, it is more accurate to say getting an opportu-
nity to negotiate a favorable settlement.  Nearly all of the store managers who survived 
summary judgment have settled with Dollar General.  See infra note 226. 
179 Thus far, district courts in the Sixth Circuit have leaned heavily on the Speedway 
opinion and used it as their controlling precedent when conducting the primary-duty 
analysis.  See Leonard v. Dolgencorp Inc., No. 10-0057, 2011 WL 2009937, at *1 (W.D. Ky. 
May 23, 2011) (“Recently, in Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, the Sixth Circuit set out a 
clear roadmap for determining [whether a Dollar General store manager’s primary duty 
is management].  The Court will follow this roadmap, noting that the facts in Speedway 
SuperAmerica are quite similar to those here.” (citation omitted)); Roberts, 2010 WL 
4806792, at *6 n.4 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2010) (discussing the split among courts regard-
ing Dollar General store managers’ FLSA-exemption status, but finding the issue “square-
ly controlled by the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Speedway”).  Not surprisingly, both the Leo-
nard and Roberts courts found the Dollar General store managers exempt as a matter of 
law.  Leonard, 2011 WL 2009937, at *10; Roberts, 2010 WL 4806792, at *11.    
180 See Jones v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-3020, 2011 WL 2261480, at *12, *14, *16-
18 (N.D. Iowa June 8, 2011) (determining that material factual disputes existed on all 
primary-duty prongs); Anderson v. Dolgencorp of N.Y., Inc., Nos. 09-0360, 09-0363, 
2011 WL 1770301, at *10-12 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011) (finding disputed questions of fact 
on the time-allocation, relative-importance, and wage-differential prongs of the 
primary-duty test); Kanatzer v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0074, 2010 WL 2720788, at *5 
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derson v. Dolgencorp of New York, Inc., did not defer even slightly to the 
Second Circuit’s Burger King II opinion and referred to it only fleeting-
ly in a citation outlining the executive exemption standard.181  In Ka-
natzer v. Dolgencorp, Inc., the Eastern District of Missouri treated the 
Eighth Circuit’s Murray opinion similarly—ignoring it entirely except 
for a brief mention in a footnote explaining that Dollar General had 
cited the case in its brief.182 
Burger King II and Murray are clearly the most relevant, if not con-
trolling, precedents in those circuits on how to interpret the primary-
duty factors as they relate to retail supervisors like Dollar General 
store managers.  Perhaps the decisions by the Anderson and Kanatzer 
courts to disregard these circuit opinions were an unconscious one, 
but that seems unlikely.  Rather, these decisions are better viewed as a 
silent indictment of the Burger King line of cases, which have over the 
years transformed an individualized executive-exemption inquiry into 
a legal conclusion that all retail supervisors are exempt as a matter of 
law.  Granted, no circuit has formally issued such a sweeping proclama-
tion because to do so would contravene the case-by-case approach re-
quired by the DOL regulations.  Nonetheless, the body of work speaks 
for itself, as circuits have found fast food restaurant assistant managers, 
the managers of small gasoline and convenience stores, and the super-
visors of low-end discount retailers all exempt as a matter of law.183 
Given the supervisors’ low-salary levels—a fact which tends to favor 
nonexemption—it is unclear when, if ever, retail managers could pre-
 
(E.D. Mo. July 8, 2010) (concluding that material disputes of fact existed on all prima-
ry-duty prongs).  But see Aschenbrenner v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-0153, 2011 WL 
2200630, at *14 (D. Neb. June 3, 2011) (finding no factual issues upon which reasona-
ble minds could disagree and thus granting summary judgment to Dollar General).     
181 Anderson, 2011 WL 177031, at *7. 
182 Kanatzer, 2010 WL 2720788, at *5 n.5.  Two other district courts in the Eighth 
Circuit have ruled on Dollar General summary judgment motions since Kanatzer.  See 
Jones, 2011 WL 2261480; Aschenbrenner, 2011 WL 2200630.  These courts referenced Mur-
ray more frequently than Kanatzer, but neither found Murray dispositive of the primary-
duty inquiry as applied to retail store managers.  In fact, at various points throughout its 
opinion, the Jones court explicitly distinguished the Dollar General facts from the Murray 
precedent.  See  Jones, 2011 WL 2261480, at *16 (“I recognize that under Eighth Cir-
cuit . . . precedent in Murray . . . , Joyner need not have ‘ultimate’ authority for all mana-
gerial decision in order to be exempt from the FLSA.  Nonetheless, I still find that a sig-
nificant question of material fact exists concerning whether Dollar General’s policies 
prevented Joyner from frequently exercising discretion ‘day-to-day’ . . . .” (citation omit-
ted) (quoting Murray v. Stuckey’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 614, 618-19 (8th Cir. 1991))).       
183 See, e.g., In re Family Dollar, 637 F.3d at 518 (discount retailers); Burgar King II, 
675 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 1982) (fast food restaurants); Thomas v. Speedway Super-
America, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 509 (6th Cir. 2007) (gasoline stores). 
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vail on overtime claims under the Burger King II framework.  Once a 
court begins to travel down the Burger King II path, the outcome of 
overtime exemption is inevitable.  Regardless of the individual set of 
facts, managerial duties will necessarily be more vital than nonmana-
gerial duties, and discretion can still be exhibited even if corporate 
policies are highly controlling.  Thus, as interpreted in Burger King II, 
the relative-importance, freedom-from-supervision, and discretionary-
powers prongs of the primary-duty inquiry will always favor exempting 
retail supervisors as a matter of law.  The time-allocation prong is not 
dispositive and simply shifts the analysis to the other pertinent factors, 
while the wage-differential prong is largely irrelevant.  Considering that 
exemption turns on the primary-duty analysis and that the Burger King 
line of cases resolves all of the critical factors in favor of the employer, 
courts cannot help but reach the legal conclusion of exemption under 
the Burger King II framework. 
Along with other district courts that have denied Dollar General’s 
motions for summary judgment, the Anderson and Kanatzer courts im-
plicitly recognized that the rigid Burger King II framework was not suf-
ficiently dynamic to account for the factual complexities of the Dollar 
General litigation.  While disclaiming its attempt to counter the Burger 
King II framework, the Eleventh Circuit in Morgan still put forth alter-
native interpretations of the relative-importance and discretionary-
powers prongs of the primary-duty analysis.184  Managerial duties will 
not always be more valuable than nonmanagerial ones and corporate 
policies, if overly prescriptive, can suffocate any meaningful mana-
gerial discretion.  Equally as important, the Eleventh Circuit reinserted 
the element of time into the primary-duty equation in a substantive way 
by allowing it to affect the analysis of other relevant factors.185 
Due to managers’ difficulty in securing overtime pay under Burger 
King II’s framework and the severe imbalance it creates between em-
ployers and employees as a result, the DOL and courts should begin 
to dismantle this paradigm.  A test more responsive to various sets of 
fact patterns that will ensure greater parity between these competing 
interest groups should replace it.  Reimagining the executive exemp-
tion will not be easy, but opinions like Morgan have begun to lay the 
groundwork.  Since the DOL revisions to the executive exemption are 
so recent, it remains highly improbable that the regulatory piece of the 
 
184 Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 2008), 
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009). 
185 Id. at 1269-70. 
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puzzle will be modified anytime soon.  With that reality in mind, courts 
should recast the primary-duty inquiry—to the extent that the DOL 
regulations and circuit precedent allow—so as to equalize the overtime 
playing field between employer and employee. 
In the following section, I suggest several ways this could be ac-
complished.  Following Morgan’s lead, courts should give more weight 
to the division of an employee’s time between managerial and non-
managerial duties by integrating it into the overall assessment of the 
relative-importance prong.  I propose a sliding-scale approach where-
by the more time an employee spends on nonmanagerial duties, the 
more evidence an employer must submit to prove that it actually con-
sidered the managerial responsibilities more important despite the 
significant time-allocation gap suggesting otherwise.  Practically, for 
this proposal to work, courts will also have to cabin the notion of con-
current duties; if not, it will be impossible to separate managerial from 
nonmanagerial functions.  This does not mean jettisoning concurrent 
duties entirely, as they are codified in the DOL regulations; rather, it 
means circumscribing their ambit as greatly as possible so that they do 
not distort the relative-importance analysis.  Furthermore, the wage-
comparison prong, currently a nonfactor, should also play a much 
more prominent role in the primary-duty inquiry. 
While courts can do much to realign the balance between em-
ployers and employees, the DOL wields the ultimate rebalancing pow-
er through its rulemaking authority.  The larger issue, which courts do 
not have the authority to rectify, is that the primary-duty analysis has 
for decades operated as the lynchpin of the executive exemption.  As I 
will argue in Section IV.D, an employee’s weekly salary level serves as a 
much better proxy for whether someone should be exempt from over-
time pay than the primary-duty test.  However, given the paltry salary-
level requirement both before and after the 2004 revisions, this ele-
ment excludes few, if any, low-salaried retail store managers from the 
executive exemption.  The DOL should institute a more vigorous sala-
ry-level requirement and update it regularly to reflect changing eco-
nomic conditions. 
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C.  Revitalizing the Relative-Importance and Wage-Differential 
Prongs of the Primary-Duty Analysis 
1.  Making Time Count:  The Sliding Scale Approach 
to the Relative-Importance Prong 
The time-allotment prong of the primary-duty analysis—both as 
codified in the DOL regulations and as interpreted by circuit courts—
serves no discernible purpose.  Practically speaking, if this prong were 
removed from courts’ application of the primary-duty test, case out-
comes would not change.  The only potential function of this prong is 
that it signals to courts when they should look to the other relevant 
primary-duty factors.  If employees spend the majority of their time on 
nonexempt work, then management might not be their primary duty, 
and so it is necessary to look at the substance of their employment re-
sponsibilities.  On the other hand, if employees spend the majority of 
their time on exempt work, then management by definition is their 
primary duty, and it is not necessary to look beyond the time-
allocation prong.  In practice, though, employees only bring overtime 
claims when they spend as much—or typically far more—time on 
nonexempt work.  Given this reality, courts treat the time-allocation 
prong in a perfunctory fashion—summarily mentioning it before mov-
ing on to the other relevant factors. 
Time should reenter the primary-duty analysis in a meaningful 
way by linking it to the relative-importance prong.  Spending ninety 
percent of one’s time on nonexempt work versus fifty percent, for ex-
ample, is not a trivial fact.  Intuitively, an employee who spends ninety 
percent of her time on nonexempt work is much less likely to have 
management as her primary duty than someone who splits her time 
evenly between menial and managerial tasks.  Yet the current execu-
tive exemption, at least as applied by the overwhelming majority of 
appellate courts, fails to take into account this critical distinction.  
From Burger King I to In re Family Dollar, courts have entirely divorced 
the allocation of an employee’s time from the other relevant factors 
and thus prevented it from bearing substantively on case dispositions. 
The error of this divorce can be seen most powerfully in the rela-
tive-importance prong.  Circuits have almost universally reached the 
conclusion that managerial activities are more important to the success 
of a business than the performance of nonexempt work.  Assuming that 
an employee divides her time equally between exempt and nonexempt 
work, it is hard to disagree with this assessment.  In these situations, if 
an employer had to choose whether it wanted the exempt or non-
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exempt work performed, it would likely choose the exempt work, as 
nonperformance of exempt work would probably affect the successful 
operation of the business more so than that of nonexempt work. 
However, the more time an employee spends on nonexempt 
work in relation to exempt work, the less tenable the position staked 
out by these circuits becomes.  For instance, which becomes more 
important when an employee spends twenty percent of her time on 
managerial duties and eighty percent on menial work?  Would an 
employer really value the managerial duties over the nonexempt 
work in that case?  Stated differently, which is more important to the 
success of the business?  The response might depend on the specific 
managerial tasks involved, but it is not immediately clear that the an-
swer would be exempt work. 
Given the contextual nature of the inquiry, courts should not 
compare the importance of managerial versus nonmanagerial duties 
without also considering how much time an employee devotes to 
each.  Either the DOL, through revised regulations, or courts, within 
the existing regulatory framework, could operationalize the interplay 
between the time-allotment and relative-importance prongs of the 
primary-duty analysis by adopting a sliding-scale approach.  If an em-
ployee’s time is split relatively evenly between exempt and nonexempt 
work, then the relative-importance prong favors the employer, and 
the employee will have to put forth evidence to rebut the resulting 
presumption.  As the amount of time dedicated to nonexempt work in-
creases, the less the relative-importance prong favors the employer and 
the more it begins to favor the employee.  If the percentage of time 
spent on nonexempt work exceeds seventy percent, say, the employer 
must convince the court that the exempt work is more important. 
2.  Limiting the Ambit of Concurrent Duties 
Perhaps the most far-reaching and perplexing innovation of Burg-
er King II is the notion of concurrent duties, which the DOL codified 
in its updated regulations.186  The underlying premise is a sound one:  
exempt and nonexempt work can be performed simultaneously.  The 
examples provided by the DOL in the regulations—as when an em-
ployee serves customers or stocks shelves while directing others’ 
work187—demonstrate the concept. 
 
186 29 C.F.R. § 541.106 (2010). 
187 Id. § 541.106(b); see also supra text accompanying note 175. 
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Difficulty arises only when courts must separate exempt from 
nonexempt work for primary-duty purposes.  If taken to their logical 
extreme, concurrent duties would swallow any meaningful distinction 
between exempt and nonexempt work.  Theoretically, any menial task 
can be performed while supervising others.  If something as solitary as 
stocking shelves can be considered a duty concurrent with manage-
ment, then it is unclear what nonexempt task would fall outside of the 
concurrent-duties ambit. 
The Fourth Circuit in In re Family Dollar takes concurrent duties to 
their logical extreme and in so doing illustrates how they can distort 
the primary-duty analysis.  The court first determined that the Family 
Dollar store manager could both perform menial tasks and operate 
the store at the same time.188  To demonstrate how the store manager 
was able to multitask, the court pulled statements from her deposition 
testimony.  The manager herself, according to the court, admitted 
that she was “responsible for making sure the whole store ran success-
fully” regardless of whether she “happened to be putting up stock at a 
given moment or running a register or talking to a customer.”189  While 
the store manager claimed to have spent ninety-nine percent of her 
time performing nonexempt work,190 the court found that these non-
managerial tasks could not be separated from her ever-present mana-
gerial duties as the store’s manager.191  As such, the court held that the 
store manager “was performing management duties whenever she was 
in the store, even though she also devoted most of her time to doing 
the mundane physical activities necessary for its successful operation.”192 
The implication of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling is that regardless of 
the actual amount of time retail store managers spend on nonexempt 
tasks, they are always “responsibl[e] to see that the store operate[s] 
successfully and profitably” and thus are always concurrently perform-
ing managerial duties.193  In making the scope of concurrent duties 
boundless, the Fourth Circuit eroded any principled distinction be-
tween exempt and nonexempt duties and eviscerated the sliding-scale 
 
188 See In re Family Dollar, 637 F.3d at 515-16 (“[W]hile [the store manager] per-
formed nonmanagerial tasks around the store as she determined necessary, she concur-
rently performed the managerial duties of running the store.”). 
189 Id. at 516. 
190 Id. at 514. 
191 See id. at 516 (concluding that the store manager performed nonmanagerial 
functions “in the context of her overall responsibility to see that the store operated 
successfully and profitably”). 
192 Id. at 517. 
193 Id. at 516.  
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approach to the relative-importance prong proposed in subsection 
IV.C.1.  The importance of concurrent duties within the court’s opi-
nion cannot be overstated, as it frames the court’s analysis of the other 
primary-duty factors.194  While not problematic on its face, this ap-
proach essentially renders these other factors irrelevant and trans-
forms concurrent duties into the dispositive issue.  When conducting 
the primary-duty analysis courts should accordingly cabin the notion 
of concurrent duties as much as possible. 
3.  Putting the Wage-Comparison Prong to Work 
a.  The Hourly-Wage Versus Lump-Sum Salary Approach 
The wage-comparison prong195 takes the prize for being the least 
developed and most underutilized factor when courts assess a retail 
store manager’s primary duty.196  This prong essentially requires courts 
to compare the store manager’s earnings to the wages of the em-
ployees whom she supervises, namely assistant store managers.197  Al-
though some disagreement exists among district courts as to whether 
a store manager’s salary should be measured against other employees’ 
 
194 The court spent eight rather sizeable paragraphs discussing concurrent duties 
and then four on the other relevant factors.  See id. at 515-18.  In introducing its analy-
sis of the latter four factors, the court explained:  “With respect to the second, third, and 
fourth factors for determining whether management was [the store manager’s] primary 
duty, the facts discussed with respect to the first factor satisfy these factors also.”  Id. at 517.  
195 The executive-exemption regulations provide that courts, when undertaking 
the primary-duty analysis, should consider “the relationship between the employee’s 
salary and the wages paid to other employees for the kind of nonexempt work per-
formed by the employee.”  29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a) (2010).  The previous regulations 
employed essentially the same language.  See 29 C.F.R. § 541.103 (2003) (amended 
2004) (providing that in performing the primary-duty inquiry courts should assess “the 
relationship between his [the supervisor’s] salary and the wages paid other employees 
for the kind of nonexempt work performed by the supervisor” (emphasis added)).     
196 See, e.g., Murray v. Stuckey’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 614, 618 (8th Cir. 1991) (listing the 
wage-comparison prong among the primary duty factors but failing to consider it); 
Burger King II, 675 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 1982) (concluding that, relative to employees 
doing exclusively non-exempt work, the Burger King assistant managers “were paid 
substantially higher wages even taking their longer hours into account”); Burger King I, 
672 F.2d 221, 225-26 (1st Cir. 1982) (finding that some of the primary duty factors 
“quite clearly cut in favor of” exemption, notably “a comparison of wages with other 
employees,” but providing no analysis as to why). 
197 See, e.g., In re Family Dollar, 637 F.3d at 517 (explaining that courts are to 
“look to the relationship between the store manager’s salary and nonexempt em-
ployees’ wages”). 
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weekly or hourly pay,198 circuit courts have unanimously adopted the 
hourly-wage comparison approach.199 
Without question, courts should compare wages on an hourly ba-
sis, as opposed to employing a weekly lump-sum salary approach.  The 
purpose of the primary-duty inquiry’s wage-comparison prong is not 
to determine whether the store manager received greater compensa-
tion overall than other employees, but whether she earned more per 
unit of time worked.200  If the store manager only makes more than 
 
198 Compare Moore v. Tractor Supply Co., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1278-79 (S.D. Fla. 
2004) (comparing the store manager’s weekly salary to that earned by other employees 
without accounting for the difference in number of hours worked), aff’d per curiam, 
140 Fed. App’x 168 (11th Cir. 2005), with Johnson v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 
2d 903, 923 (E.D. La. 2009) (comparing the assistant store manager’s salary to that 
earned by subordinates on an hourly basis).  Only three of the eighteen Dollar General 
courts declined to convert a store manager’s weekly salary into an hourly rate of pay.  
See Leonard v. Dolgencorp Inc., No. 10-0057, 2011 WL 2009937, at *9 (W.D. Ky. May 
23, 2011) (refusing to adopt an hourly-wage comparison approach because the man-
agers’ “hours reflect her greater responsibility and provide her the opportunity to earn 
more”); Hartman v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0009, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Tex. 
June 24, 2010) (“Although Plaintiff attempts to divide her weekly salary by alleged 
hours worked, courts have disregarded this attempt and focused instead on the weekly 
amount of pay.”); Johnson v. DG Retail LLC, No. 08-0123, 2010 WL 1929620, at *6 (D. 
Utah May 13, 2010) (contending that the store manager’s “argument” that her salary 
should be converted into an hourly rate “collapses on itself” because she “was not con-
fined to work a certain number of hours”).   
 Rather than converting the store manager’s salary into an hourly rate, the Hale 
court converted other employees’ wages into a weekly salary based on the alleged 
number of hours that the store manager worked and then compared that figure with 
the store manager’s weekly salary.  Hale v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0014, 2010 WL 
2595313, at *6 (W.D. Va. June 23, 2010).  Per the FLSA’s mandate, the court calculated 
the employees’ wages at time and a half their regular pay rate for any time worked over 
the forty-hour work week.  Id.  While novel and intriguing, the court’s approach to the 
wage-comparison prong assumes incorrectly that these other employees would have to 
put in more than forty hours per week to do the same amount of work as the store 
manager.  Dollar General could instead hire part-time help at the same pay rate as 
these employees or schedule store clerks whose hours otherwise would fall below forty 
hours per week for more time.                  
199 See In re Family Dollar, 637 F.3d at 517-18 (converting the store manager’s salary 
into an hourly wage and comparing it to the hourly wages of other employees); Mor-
gan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008) (same), cert. de-
nied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009); Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 508-
09 (6th Cir. 2007) (same).  
200 The Plaunt court, which denied Dollar General’s summary judgment motion, 
captures this reasoning most powerfully: 
We find that converting [the store manager’s] weekly salary into an effective 
hourly wage is most appropriate in order to find a common basis with which 
to compare the wages paid to others.  To ignore the fact that Plaunt worked 
more than forty hours per week would largely frustrate the purpose of this in-
quiry:  to determine whether the employer sought to subvert the FLSA by at-
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other employees because she works longer hours, she is not being 
compensated for her management skills.  Rather, she is simply getting 
paid for the sheer amount of work done.  In other words, evidence 
that the hourly wages of the store manager and the other employees 
are roughly equal tilts heavily against the contention that the manag-
er’s primary duty is management.  If her primary duty were manage-
ment, then she should be compensated accordingly. 
b.  The Quandary of Bonuses 
Courts have disagreed about whether to consider bonuses within 
the wage-comparison prong, and if so, how to analyze them.  Courts’ 
approaches with regard to bonuses can be divided into four catego-
ries:  (1) ignore bonuses entirely;201 (2) compare managers’ opportu-
nity for bonuses or bonuses actually awarded with that of other em-
ployees;202 (3) count managers’ ability to earn bonuses as a plus factor 
for overtime exemption;203 and (4) combine bonuses earned with 
managers’ salaries.204  While none of these approaches predominates 
in the Dollar General summary judgment rulings, most courts at least 
acknowledge that bonuses should be factored into the wage-
comparison analysis. 
Many courts examine bonuses independently of weekly salaries.  
Some courts electing this approach compare actual bonuses earned by 
store managers to those earned by fellow workers, while others com-
pare the two groups’ bonus-earning potential.  Under either method, 
 
taching an overtime exemption to an employee who otherwise performs the 
same non-exempt tasks as hourly employees.  
Plaunt v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0084, 2010 WL 5158620, at *13 (M.D. Pa. 
Dec. 14, 2010); see also Pierce v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0097, 2011 WL 
398366, at *12 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2011) (employing verbatim Plaunt’s rationale).     
201 See, e.g., Jones v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-3020, 2011 WL 2261480, at *2, *17-18 
(N.D. Iowa June 8, 2011) (stating in the fact section that the store manager earned a 
bonus but failing to consider this bonus award in the wage-comparison prong); Pierce, 
2011 WL 398366, at *1, *11-12 (same); King v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0146, slip op. 
at 14, 27-28 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2010) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge) 
(same), adopted by No. 09-0146 ( Jun. 17, 2010) (order adopting report and recom-
mendation of magistrate judge). 
202 See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.   
203 See infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.  
204 See, e.g., Mayne-Harrison v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0042, 2010 WL 3717604, 
at *23 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 17, 2010) (commenting that the store manager’s “salary was 
not the totality of [her] compensation” and adding bonuses earned to her annual sala-
ry); Myrick v. Dolgencorp, LLC, No. 09-0005, 2010 WL 146874, at *7 n.12 (M.D. Ga. 
Jan. 11, 2010) (factoring the store manager’s bonuses into her salary when undertak-
ing the wage-comparison analysis). 
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if the manager earned more or could potentially earn more in bonus-
es than other employees, the wage-comparison prong would tilt in fa-
vor of exemption.  For instance, in Hale v. Dolgencorp, Inc., the Western 
District of Virginia found that “the bonus paid to Hale weigh[ed] 
against a finding that Hale’s salary was similar, or close to, the salary of 
an hourly worker because Hale earned a ten percent bonus based 
upon the store’s profit while the remainder of the profit was prorated 
among lower-paid employees.”205  Likewise, the District of Nebraska de-
termined in Aschenbrenner v. Dolgencorp, Inc., that the store manager’s 
opportunity to earn a “bonus was more than three times larger than her 
[assistant store manager’s] bonus and five times larger than the bonus 
pool split by all store clerks.  As such, a reasonable jury could only con-
clude that Aschenbrenner was earning substantially more as a store 
manager than other, nonexempt employees.”206 
Other courts that analyze bonuses independently of weekly sala-
ries count managers’ ability to earn bonuses as a plus factor for over-
time exemption.  For example, the Fourth Circuit in In re Family Dollar 
developed the notion of a “profit center,” which considers “whether 
the manager had the ability to influence the amount of her compen-
sation.”207  The court found that the Family Dollar store manager’s 
bonus “depended on her store’s profitability” and thus that the store 
operated as a “profit center.”208  The fact that the store manager could 
 
205 No. 09-0014, 2010 WL 2595313, at *6 (W.D. Va. June 23, 2010); see also In re 
Dollar Gen. FLSA Litig., 766 F. Supp. 2d 631, 648-49 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (finding that the 
store manager “received a larger bonus than the other employees” and that this fact 
pushed the wage-comparison prong toward exemption). 
206 No. 10-0153, 2011 WL 2200630, at *19 (D. Neb. June 3, 2011).  But see Ander-
son v. Dolgencorp of N.Y., Inc., Nos. 09-0360, 09-0363, 2011 WL 1770301, at *13 
(N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011) (acknowledging that the store manager was “eligible for a larg-
er bonus” than the assistant manager but that this “bonus eligibility, while relevant, 
does not . . . conclusively tip the scales in favor of summary judgment”). 
207 637 F.3d 508, 517 (4th Cir. 2011).  The Western District of Kentucky in a Dollar 
General summary judgment ruling picked up on the Fourth Circuit’s “profit center” 
concept.  See Leonard v. Dolgencorp Inc., No. 10-0057, 2011 WL 2009937, at *9 (W.D. 
Ky. May 23, 2011) (“The structure of [the store manager’s] compensation—that is, the 
substantial bonus opportunity—further reflects her central role in the store as a profit 
center.  All of the discretion, authority and leadership she exercised was viewed as con-
tributing to store performance.  As such, she was paid accordingly.” (emphasis add-
ed)).  Somewhat perplexingly, the Leonard court did not attribute its use of “profit cen-
ter” to the Fourth Circuit. 
208 In re Family Dollar, 637 F.3d at 517. 
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influence the store’s profitability, and, as a result, the amount in bonus-
es she earned, pointed toward management as her primary duty.209 
While bonuses should be considered in the wage-comparison 
analysis, they should not be analyzed independently of managers’ sal-
aries.  Comparing bonuses in isolation provides little insight into 
whether the store manager earned substantially more on the whole 
than her subordinates.  Only when combined with a manager’s salary 
do bonuses acquire significance.  As such, courts should add bonuses 
to managers’ annual salaries and then compute an hourly wage rate.  
This way the wage-comparison prong will take into account a manag-
er’s overall annual compensation. 
c.  What Pay Differentials Are Significant? 
Even though most courts employ the hourly wage-comparison ap-
proach, and to some extent incorporate bonuses into the inquiry, 
there are serious disagreements as to how significant the pay differen-
tial must be to find that a store manager’s primary duty is manage-
ment.  On one end of the spectrum, the Morgan court found that a 
two- to three-dollar-per-hour pay differential (i.e., a thirty-one percent 
pay gap) between Family Dollar store managers and their assistant 
managers constituted “a relatively small difference” in hourly rates.210  
On the other end, the Speedway court determined that an “approx-
imately thirty percent” pay gap between the store manager and subor-
dinate employees “equated to a significant amount.”211  District courts 
in the Dollar General cases have similarly disagreed about what pay 
gaps are significant.212 
 
209 Id. at 517-18.  Alongside its “profit center” analysis, the Fourth Circuit ex-
amined whether the Family Dollar store manager “earned more, in absolute terms, 
than nonmanagerial employees.”  Id. at 517.  Here, the court not only compared the 
hourly wage rate of the manager and other employees but also the actual bonuses 
earned by the two groups.  Id. 
210 Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1257-58, 1271 (11th Cir. 
2008).  The court did not state this percentage explicitly.  But if one subtracts the 
hourly wage of the assistant store managers ($7.60) from the store managers’ ($9.99) 
and divides by the assistant store managers’ wage rate ($7.60), the result is approx-
imately thirty-one percent.    
211 Thomas v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 509 (6th Cir. 2007). 
212 Compare, e.g., Myrick v. Dolgencorp, LLC, No. 09-0005, 2010 WL 146874, at *7 
(M.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2010) (finding that the store manager “made, at most, $2.85 more 
per hour” than her assistant managers—a 40.7% pay differential—and that, in light of 
Morgan, this difference was not significant), with Roberts v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-
0005, 2010 WL 4806792, at *10 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2010) (“The plaintiff’s ‘hourly’ 
salary was between 20 and 36 percent higher than the next highest paid non-salary 
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The fundamental dilemma is that the DOL has failed to provide 
guidance on how courts are to use the wage-comparison prong, and 
more specifically, what constitutes a significant gap in pay.  Courts 
understandably divide on the issue of whether a two-to-three dollar 
pay gap is significant.  Such a small hourly differential may not seem 
like much, but over the course of a year it can add up to a sizeable 
amount.  Most Dollar General store managers claimed to have worked 
at least fifty hours per week,213 with many asserting that they worked 
sixty hours or more.214  A two-dollar hourly differential translates into 
an annual difference of $5200 and $6240 for a fifty- and sixty-hour 
work week, respectively, while the same calculations at a three-dollar 
hourly pay gap yield $7800 and $9360 more for a store manager over a 
fifty-two week period. 
Several courts in the Dollar General cases have held that so long 
as store managers make “more, or at least the same,” as assistant man-
agers, then the wage-comparison prong weighs in favor of exemp-
tion.215  If that were the case, then this prong would always support a 
finding that the store manager had management as her primary duty.  
Slight differences in pay, as discussed previously, surely point toward 
the contrary conclusion that the manager should be nonexempt.  Al-
though it is difficult, if not impossible, to develop a principled cutoff 
for when the pay differential favors, or does not favor, exemption, 
small differences in pay call into question whether a manager’s prima-
ry duty is in fact management.  Differences of a dollar or less certainly 
favor nonexemption.  Differences between one or two dollars, though 
closer, favor nonexemption as well, while two-to-three dollar differ-
ences could potentially go either way.  The key, in the end, is that 
 
employee, not to mention other ‘subordinate employees.’  Under Speedway, this calcu-
lus supports the defendant’s primary duty argument.”). 
213 See, e.g., Plaunt v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0084, 2010 WL 5158620, at 
*1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2010) (finding that “[o]n average” the store manager “worked 
fifty hours per week”); Kanatzer v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0074, 2010 WL 2720788, at 
*2 (E.D. Mo. July 8, 2010) (noting that until 2005 the store manager “worked fifty 
hours per week”).  
214 See, e.g., Leonard v. Dolgencorp Inc., No. 10-0057, 2011 WL 2009937, at *2 
(W.D. Ky. May 23, 2011) (explaining that the store manager “worked between 60 and 
80 hours per week”); Hale v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0014, 2010 WL 2595313, at *3 
(W.D. Va. June 23, 2010) (finding that the store manager “averaged between sixty to 
seventy hours of work per week”).  
215 Mayne-Harrison v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0042, 2010 WL 3717604, at *23 
(N.D. W. Va. Sept. 17, 2010); accord In re Dollar Gen. Stores FLSA Litig., 766 F. Supp. 
2d 631, 649 (E.D.N.C. 2011).  
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courts should inject more vigor into the wage-comparison prong and 
actually make it count in the primary-duty analysis. 
D.  Taking the Executive Exemption’s Salary-Level 
Requirement More Seriously 
Operating in the background of cases like those in the Dollar 
General litigation is the normative question of who merits FLSA over-
time protection and why the white collar exemptions even exist.  
While neither the FLSA nor its legislative history provides a rationale for 
the white collar exemptions,216 scholars have offered a number of expla-
nations—from the exempted workers’ social status to the indivisibility of 
the work they perform.  L. Camille Hebert offers a helpful summary of 
these explanations: 
The theory behind the [white collar] exemptions . . . has been that these 
employees do not need the protections of the overtime requirements 
because of their higher base pay and their greater job security.  In addi-
tion, to the extent that the overtime provisions were intended to cause 
employers to create more jobs by hiring more workers to perform the 
additional work, it appears that this option is less feasible in connection 
with the type of work performed by these categories of employees.  Final-
ly, the value to the employer of the work of executive, administrative, or 
professional employees is thought to be generally unrelated to the num-
ber of hours worked by those employees, so that they are neither paid 
more for working more hours a week nor paid less for working less hours 
in a given week.217  
Leading up to the 2004 revisions, scholars advocated for overhauling 
the exemptions in light of the modern service-oriented economy.218  
As Hebert explains, 
 
216 See, e.g., Defining and Delimiting Exemptions, supra note 6, at 22,123-25 (de-
scribing the history of and the comments made on the exemption rules, but stopping 
short of providing a rationale); Regan C. Rowan, Comment, Solving the Bluish Collar 
Problem:  An Analysis of the DOL’s Modernization of the Exemptions to the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 119, 124 (2004) (“The legislative history of the FLSA con-
tains no explanation for the white collar exemptions.”). 
217 L. Camille Hebert, “Updating” the “White-Collar” Employee Exemptions to the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 51, 56-57 (2003). 
218 See, e.g., DeChiara, supra note 28, at 187 (suggesting comp time as an alterna-
tive to overtime pay for overworked executives); Michael A. Faillace, Automatic Exemp-
tion of Highly-Paid Employees and Other Proposed Amendments to the White-Collar Exemptions:  
Bringing the Fair Labor Standards Act into the 21st Century, 15 LAB. LAW. 357, 360 (2000) 
(“[T]he requirements of the exemption tests under the FLSA are no longer applicable 
to modern working conditions, and . . . should [be] reform[ed] . . . substantially in 
order to respond to the legitimate needs of today’s employees and employers.”).  
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These exemptions appear to have been shaped with a relatively small 
group of high-level management and administrative personnel and rec-
ognized professions in mind, but over the years the exemptions have 
been applied to a larger group of employees, many of whom do not re-
ceive the relatively high salaries thought to justify not providing extra 
compensation for hours worked over the traditional maximum.
219
 
The DOL regulations support the notion that these white collar 
exemptions were only intended to cover a certain subset of workers—
namely those who earned above a threshold salary level.  Ever since 
the initial regulations were passed in 1938, the regulations have en-
sured that only employees earning above a certain amount may qualify 
for the executive exemption.  For the latter part of the twentieth cen-
tury, the floor for exemption was set at a weekly salary of $155220 and 
revised upwards to $455 in 2004.221 
The correlation between a worker’s salary and the executive ex-
emption makes intuitive sense.222  Salaries are generally correlated 
with the level of skills—gained through education, experience, train-
ing, etc.—that a worker has to offer.  Those with a greater skill set are 
more likely to earn a higher salary and therefore are in less need of 
FLSA overtime protection.  Thus, the less skilled the worker, the lower 
the salary, and the more FLSA overtime protection might be warranted. 
The level of pay for Dollar General store managers is critical in as-
sessing whether they should be treated as exempt executives.  Had the 
much-delayed increase in the threshold salary from $155 to $455 oc-
curred several years earlier, many of these store managers would not 
have reached the requisite level and would have been barred from ex-
emption.223  Similarly, even those who met the $455 cutoff did not 
 
219 Hebert, supra note 217, at 118 (footnotes omitted). 
220 29 C.F.R. § 541.117(a) (2003) (amended 2004). 
221 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a)(1) (2010). 
222 This correlation is also borne out in the DOL’s early and later experience with 
the test.  See Defining and Delimiting Exemptions, supra note 6, at 22,173 (“The expe-
rience of the Divisions has shown that in the categories of employees under considera-
tion the higher the salaries paid the more likely the employees are to meet all the re-
quirements for exemption.” (quoting HARRY WEISS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROPOSED REVISIONS AND REGULATIONS, PART 541, at 22-23 
(1949))); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 1, at 31 (“DOL said that sal-
ary remains a good indicator of the degree of importance attached to a particular em-
ployee’s job, which provides a practical guide, particularly in borderline cases, for dis-
tinguishing bona fide [white collar] employees from those who were not intended by 
the Congress to come within the categories of this exemption.”). 
223 See Jones v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 10-3020, 2011 WL 2261480, at *2 (N.D. Iowa 
June 8, 2011) (stating that the store manager earned a weekly salary of $440 in April 
2001); Anderson v. Dolgencorp of N.Y., Inc., Nos. 09-0360, 09-0363, 2011 WL 1770301, 
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earn much more than the minimum wage.  Store managers on aver-
age in the Dollar General cases worked 60 hours and earned $492 per 
week, resulting in an hourly wage rate of $8.20—only about a dollar 
more than the current minimum wage of $7.25.224 
The DOL should either update the insufficient salary-level cutoff or 
consider an approach similar to that in California, where workers’ sala-
ries must be twice the minimum wage to qualify for the exemption.225  
Given that Dollar General’s store managers do not earn significantly 
more on a per-hour basis than those earning the minimum wage, ex-
empting these managers from overtime pay surely contravenes the spirit 
of the FLSA.  Because of the regulations’ paltry salary-level test, these 
retail supervisors’ low economic position is not being adequately fac-
tored into the executive-exemption equation. 
CONCLUSION 
As Morgan and numerous Dollar General cases reveal, retail store 
managers can prevail on their FLSA overtime claims,226 but it is not an 
 
at *3, *6 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 2011) (noting that one of the store managers involved in the 
suit “was paid a fixed weekly salary of $425,” while the other manager initially earned 
$423 per week); Pierce v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 09-0097, 2011 WL 398366, at 
*1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2011) (stating that Pierce received weekly salaries of $355.77 and 
$423.08 in June 2001 and April 2002, respectively); In re Dollar Gen. FLSA Litig., 766 F. 
Supp. 2d 631, 633 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (explaining that the store manager earned a weekly 
salary of $385 in 2001); Speak v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0124, slip op. at 2 
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2010) (noting that in September 2001 the store manger received a 
$450 weekly salary); Plaunt v. Dolgencorp, Inc., Nos. 09-0079, 08-0084, 2010 WL 
5158620, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2010) (reporting that the plaintiff initially earned 
$425 per week); Roberts v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0005, 2010 WL 4806792, at *1 
(M.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2010) (stating that the plaintiff made $420 per week in her first 
year); Mayne-Harrison v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0042, 2010 WL 3717604, at *2 (N.D. 
W. Va. Sept. 17, 2010) (reporting that Mayne-Harrison made $370 and $423 per week 
in 2001 and 2002, respectively); Hartman v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 09-0009, slip 
op. at 2 (N.D. Tex. June 24, 2010) (pointing out that the store manager earned be-
tween $375 and $435 from 2000 until 2003); Hale v. Dolgencorp, Inc.,  No. 09-0014, 
2010 WL 2595313, at *3 (W.D. Va. June 23, 2010) (stating that Hale’s salary ranged 
from $313 to $431 per week while she managed the store); Noble v. Dolgencorp, Inc., 
No. 09-0049, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Miss. May 11, 2010) (reporting that the plaintiff initially 
made approximately $425 per week).  
224 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (Supp. III 2010). 
225 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11070(1)(A)(1)(f) (2002) (requiring an exempt 
employee to “earn a monthly salary equivalent to no less than two (2) times the state 
minimum wage for full-time employment”); see also Faillace, supra note 218, at 387 
(proposing that “all employees earning less than two times the minimum wage be 
classified as non-exempt”). 
226 While denying summary judgment for Dollar General did not end those cases, 
it was a significant burden to overcome and has resulted in favorable outcomes for 
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easily accomplished feat and will only become more challenging un-
der the amended DOL regulations.  The executive exemption, in its 
current formulation, does not adequately account for frontline super-
visors whose low-level salaries do not support their exemption from 
overtime pay.  Courts should work on revitalizing the time-allocation, 
relative-importance, and wage-comparison prongs of the primary-duty 
inquiry in an effort to reel in the undue advantages currently afforded 
employers.  Meanwhile, the DOL should make the salary-level re-
quirement a more vigorous component of the executive exemption so 
that only those workers whose salaries justify exemption will be denied 
overtime wages. 
Even with a heightened salary-level requirement and a more over-
time-friendly primary-duty inquiry, many retail store managers, espe-
cially those charged with greater managerial duties and who earn a 
higher salary, will still be found exempt.  This is how an exemption 
that strikes an appropriate balance between employers and employees 
should work—not all will be exempt and not all will be entitled to 
overtime pay.  Thousands of retail supervisors’ overtime claims hang 
in the balance.  It is time for the courts and the DOL to get to work. 
 
plaintiffs.  Dollar General has settled with the store managers in Pierce, Plaunt, Hale, 
and Myrick.  See Pierce, No. 09-0097, slip op. at 1 (May 26, 2011) (order approving indi-
vidual settlement); Plaunt, No. 09-0084, slip op. at 1 (May 26, 2010) (order approving 
individual settlement); Hale, 2010 WL 4261310, at *1-2 (Oct. 28, 2010) (order approv-
ing the filing of settlement under seal); Myrick v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0005 (M.D. 
Ga. Feb. 19, 2010) (order of dismissal) (indicating that the action has been settled).  
In Jones, one of the plaintiffs has reached a settlement agreement with Dollar Gener-
al.  See No. 10-3020, slip op. at 2 (Aug. 31, 2011) (order approving settlement).  
Another plaintiff motioned for dismissal so that she could become a party in Richter 
v. Dolgencorp, Inc.  See Joint Stipulation of Dismissal Without Prejudice at 1, Kanatzer 
v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 09-0074 (E.D. Mo. July 26, 2010).  As of October 2011, An-
derson remains open.    
